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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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6 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 4/14/2026
Analyzed 7/20/2026

The paper describes a specific black-box knowledge-base poisoning attack against retrieval-augmented reasoning systems. An attacker who can add one query-specific document to the corpus can cause it to be retrieved and influence the LLM toward an attacker-chosen answer. AdversarialCoT shapes the document around the target model’s observable reasoning structure and iteratively refines retrieval relevance and persuasive reasoning using final model feedback. The paper reports this as an…

AdversarialCoT: Single-Document Retrieval Poisoning for LLM Reasoning
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, GLM 4.5, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Taming openclaw: Security analysis and mitigation of autonomous llm agent threats
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

The OpenClaw autonomous agent framework lacks execution sandboxing, running agents directly on the host machine with the disk and system privileges of the host user. This architecture allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) and arbitrary data exfiltration via Indirect Prompt Injection. By embedding malicious instructions within external data sources (e.g., scraped web pages or uploaded documents), an attacker can hijack the agent's planning capabilities to sequentially chain…

Uncovering Security Threats and Architecting Defenses in Autonomous Agents: A Case Study of OpenClaw
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

LLM-as-a-Judge systems utilizing natural language rubrics are vulnerable to Rubric-Induced Preference Drift (RIPD). This vulnerability allows an attacker (or a flawed optimization process) to refine evaluation rubrics such that they maintain high agreement with human references on standard validation benchmarks while inducing systematic, directional preference degradation on unseen target domains. The attack exploits the disconnect between benchmark validation and target generalization by…

Rubrics as an Attack Surface: Stealthy Preference Drift in LLM Judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek V3 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Predictive Large Language Model (LLM) routers, specifically those utilizing Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Matrix Factorization (MF) architectures, are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation and backdoor poisoning. These routers are designed to optimize cost and latency by dynamically directing simple queries to "weak" (cheap) models and complex queries to "strong" (expensive) models. Attackers can exploit this mechanism in two ways: 1. Inference-time Attacks: By appending specific adversarial…

Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM Router
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.