Language Model Security Database

The paper describes a specific black-box knowledge-base poisoning attack against retrieval-augmented reasoning systems. An attacker who can add one query-specific document to the corpus can cause it to be retrieved and influence the LLM toward an attacker-chosen answer. AdversarialCoT shapes the document around the target model’s observable reasoning structure and iteratively refines retrieval relevance and persuasive reasoning using final model feedback. The paper reports this as an…

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Multi-Agent Systems based on Large Language Models (LLM-MAS) are vulnerable to systemic Consensus Corruption via cascading error amplification. Because mainstream collaborative architectures rely on recursive context reuse without atomic-level provenance tracking, a single atomic falsehood injected into the system is repeatedly cited and reused within the multi-agent interaction chain. This structural exposure causes the error to deterministically compound across the communication graph…

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) optimized via Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) are vulnerable to context pollution in their reasoning traces. An attacker can induce catastrophic reasoning failure by injecting locally coherent but logically or mathematically corrupted snippets into the model's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or conditioning context. Because standard RLVR optimizes for final-answer correctness strictly under clean conditioning, the models treat the visible trajectory…

A behavioral vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agents where task-irrelevant persuasion introduced in prior interactions or system contexts induces a persistent "belief state" that alters downstream task execution. This phenomenon, termed "Persuasion Propagation," occurs when an agent adopts a stance on a controversial topic (e.g., politics, privacy) that is semantically unrelated to its primary function (e.g., coding, medical research). This adopted stance acts as a latent…

LLM-as-a-Judge systems utilizing natural language rubrics are vulnerable to Rubric-Induced Preference Drift (RIPD). This vulnerability allows an attacker (or a flawed optimization process) to refine evaluation rubrics such that they maintain high agreement with human references on standard validation benchmarks while inducing systematic, directional preference degradation on unseen target domains. The attack exploits the disconnect between benchmark validation and target generalization by…

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…