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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

25 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agent Lifecycle Compound Threats

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…

Taming openclaw: Security analysis and mitigation of autonomous llm agent threats
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-Stream Thinking Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) equipped with built-in "thinking" or step-by-step reasoning modes allows attackers to bypass safety alignments, trigger reasoning collapse, and cause resource exhaustion. The vulnerability is exploited via a Multi-Stream Perturbation Attack, which fragments the sequential integrity of a harmful prompt by word-by-word interleaving it with benign auxiliary tasks (e.g., "Explain the water cycle"). By wrapping the benign text streams in specific…

Multi-Stream Perturbation Attack: Breaking Safety Alignment of Thinking LLMs Through Concurrent Task Interference
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 1.7B, Qwen 3 4B, Qwen 3 8B+2 more
  • Qwen 3 1.7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 Max
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash

TabooRAG Transferable Blocking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to perform a highly transferable Denial-of-Service (DoS) or "blocking" attack. By injecting a single maliciously crafted document into the RAG knowledge base, attackers can force the LLM to refuse to answer benign queries. Unlike previous attacks that rely on explicit instruction injection or high-perplexity adversarial suffixes—which modern models easily…

When Safety Becomes a Vulnerability: Exploiting LLM Alignment Homogeneity for Transferable Blocking in RAG
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, GPT-5 Mini, DeepSeek V3.2+4 more
  • GPT-5.2
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Ministral 3 8B Instruct-2512

Adaptive Web Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) based web agents (such as those built using the BrowserUse scaffold) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks when autonomously navigating and processing untrusted web content. Unlike standard Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), this vulnerability occurs when the LLM orchestrator consumes the DOM or visual screenshots of a webpage containing concealed or contextually disguised adversarial instructions. The LLM interprets these embedded text strings as…

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct

Fill-Squeeze Scheduler DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM serving frameworks utilizing continuous batching and PagedAttention (such as vLLM, SGLang, and Orca) are vulnerable to a resource exhaustion Denial-of-Service attack known as "Fill and Squeeze." An unprivileged remote attacker can exploit the deterministic state transitions of the scheduler's memory management to induce severe latency or service denial. The attack leverages a side-channel vulnerability where Inter-Token Latency (ITL) correlates linearly with global KV-cache usage due to…

Rethinking Latency Denial-of-Service: Attacking the LLM Serving Framework, Not the Model
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 8B, Gemma 3 12B IT, DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B+1 more
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Invisible Prompt Phishing Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal LLM-based phishing detection systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via "perceptual asymmetry." Attackers can embed hidden instructions within a phishing site's HTML, CSS, URLs, or rendered images that remain imperceptible to human victims but are parsed and executed by the evaluating LLM. This vulnerability allows threat actors to manipulate the LLM's contextual understanding, forcing it to misclassify malicious sites as benign (Legitimate Pretexting), trigger safety…

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning, Llama 4 Maverick+1 more
  • GPT-5
  • Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 27B

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Pathological Reasoning DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allows attackers to perform Prompt-Induced Inference-Time Denial-of-Service (PI-DoS) attacks by submitting short, semantically coherent adversarial prompts. These prompts, which often take the form of complex logic puzzles with nested dependencies or contradictory constraints, exploit the adaptive computation mechanism of LRMs to force the model into pathologically long, nearly non-terminating intermediate reasoning traces (e.g., generating…

ReasoningBomb: A Stealthy Denial-of-Service Attack by Inducing Pathologically Long Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Kimi K2 Instruct, DeepSeek R1+8 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • MiniMax M2
  • Nemotron 3 Nano 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview

Visual Object Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo+7 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro 002
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku 20241022
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.