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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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7 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Audio Narrative Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

End-to-end Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to paralinguistic jailbreak attacks where the acoustic delivery style of an input—specifically tone, prosody, and emotional framing—overrides safety alignment mechanisms. Unlike adversarial perturbations that inject noise, this vulnerability exploits the model's personification bias by utilizing standard Text-to-Speech (TTS) synthesis to render prohibited instructions in psychologically manipulative vocal styles (e.g…

Now You Hear Me: Audio Narrative Attacks Against Large Audio-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Realtime, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Speech-Audio Composition Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing speech and audio are vulnerable to Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks. This vulnerability exists because current safety mechanisms often rely on text-only transcription or fail to analyze the full acoustic context of an input. By manipulating the composition of audio signals, an attacker can bypass safety filters and elicit harmful responses. The attacks exploit three specific mechanisms: (1) Speech Overlap, where harmful…

Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks on Multimodal LLMs and Their Defense with SALMONN-Guard
Evaluated models: Qwen2-Audio 7B, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B, Step-Audio 2 Mini Base+6 more
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B
  • Step-Audio 2 Mini Base
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6 8B
  • Qwen3-Omni 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Kimi-Audio 7B Instruct
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

LAM Speech Style Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to style-aware audio jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies often overlook the expressive variations of human speech. Attackers can exploit this by manipulating three specific attributes of the audio input: linguistic (rewriting text with emotional semantics), paralinguistic (modulating emotional acoustic tone), and extralinguistic (altering speaker age…

StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Semantic Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to adversarial signal-level perturbations that allow for the bypass of safety guardrails (jailbreaking). While these models may possess robust text-based safety alignment, they fail to generalize this robustness to the audio modality. Attackers can utilize the Audio Perturbation Toolkit (APT) to apply transformations in the time domain (Energy Distribution Perturbation, Trimming, Fade In/Out), frequency domain (Pitch Shifting, Temporal…

Audio Jailbreak: An Open Comprehensive Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Audio-Language Models
Evaluated models: SpeechGPT, SALMONN, DiVA+4 more
  • SpeechGPT
  • SALMONN
  • DiVA
  • Qwen 2 Audio
  • Llama Omni
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o Audio

Multi-Accent Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multilingual and multi-accent audio inputs, combined with acoustic adversarial perturbations (reverberation, echo, whisper effects), can bypass safety mechanisms in Large Audio Language Models (LALMs), causing them to generate unsafe or harmful outputs. The vulnerability is amplified by the interaction between acoustic and linguistic variations, particularly in languages with less training data.

Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs
Evaluated models: DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B, MERaLion AudioLLM, MiniCPM-o 2.6+2 more
  • DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B
  • MERaLion AudioLLM
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6
  • Qwen 2 Audio
  • Ultravox

Adversarial Speech Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) processing speech input are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Imperceptible perturbations added to audio input can cause the model to generate unsafe or harmful text responses, overriding built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are effective even with limited knowledge of the model's internal workings, demonstrating transferability across different models.

SpeechGuard: Exploring the adversarial robustness of multimodal large language models
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 XL, Llama 7B, Llama 2 13B Chat+2 more
  • Flan-T5 XL
  • Llama 7B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • SpeechGPT

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.