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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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3 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 3/8/2026

Reasoning-specialized Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to reasoning-exploitation jailbreaks. Attackers can bypass standard safety alignments (such as RLHF) by using adaptive multi-turn interactions or semantic transformations to induce the model to generate intermediate reasoning steps that "rationalize" or "contextualize" a harmful request. Because current alignment techniques often fail to scale linearly with reasoning depth, forcing…

TeleAI-Safety: A comprehensive LLM jailbreaking benchmark towards attacks, defenses, and evaluations
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini +11 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.