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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Visual Role-Play Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal jailbreak attack, termed Visual Role-Play (VRP), which leverages role-playing image characters to elicit harmful responses. VRP generates images depicting high-risk characters (e.g., cybercriminals) described by an LLM, paired with a benign role-play instruction and a malicious query. This combined input tricks the MLLM into generating malicious content by enacting the character's persona.

Visual-RolePlay: Universal Jailbreak Attack on MultiModal Large Language Models via Role-playing Image Characte
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, Internvlchat-v1.5, LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B+4 more
  • Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision
  • Internvlchat-v1.5
  • LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Omnilmm (12B)
  • Qwen-vl-chat (7B)
  • Stable Diffusion

LLM Prompt Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks via inversion of their normal outputs. An attacker can train a model to reconstruct the prompt used to generate multiple outputs from an LLM, even without access to internal model parameters (logits) or requiring adversarial queries. This allows extraction of both user and system prompts.

Extracting Prompts by Inverting LLM Outputs
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+6 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama2-chat-7B
  • Llama-3-70B-chat-hf
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral-8x22B-instruct-v0.1
  • Qwen1.5-110B-chat

WordGame LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack, "WordGame," which leverages simultaneous query and response obfuscation to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack replaces malicious words with word games in the query, forcing the LLM to reason through the game before addressing the original malicious intent. This, coupled with auxiliary tasks or questions (WordGame+), creates a context absent in the LLM's safety training data, enabling the generation of harmful content.

WordGame: Efficient & Effective LLM Jailbreak via Simultaneous Obfuscation in Query and Response
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Self-Explanatory LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows for near-perfect jailbreaking via iterative prompt refinement and self-explanation. The attacker uses the LLM itself to iteratively refine adversarial prompts by requesting self-explanations of failed attempts, ultimately generating prompts that bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful content. A subsequent "Rate+Enhance" step further maximizes the harmfulness of the generated output.

GPT-4 Jailbreaks Itself with Near-Perfect Success Using Self-Explanation
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-4+5 more
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B

Logit-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several large language models (LLMs) allowing attackers to manipulate the models' output logits, biasing the probability distribution toward the generation of harmful content. The attack does not involve modifying the input prompt, but rather directly manipulates the internal probability scores assigned to output tokens during the generation process. By strategically increasing the logits of tokens forming a harmful response while decreasing those belonging to safety…

Lockpicking LLMs: A Logit-Based Jailbreak Using Token-level Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Adaptive Sparse Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in several open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking via Adaptive Dense-to-Sparse Constrained Optimization (ADC). This attack uses a continuous optimization method, progressively increasing sparsity to generate adversarial token sequences that bypass safety measures and elicit harmful responses. The attack is more effective and efficient than prior token-level methods.

Efficient LLM Jailbreak via Adaptive Dense-to-sparse Constrained Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama2-chat-7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama2-chat-7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Zephyr 7B Beta
  • Zephyr 7B R2D2

Adversarial Speech Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) processing speech input are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Imperceptible perturbations added to audio input can cause the model to generate unsafe or harmful text responses, overriding built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are effective even with limited knowledge of the model's internal workings, demonstrating transferability across different models.

SpeechGuard: Exploring the adversarial robustness of multimodal large language models
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 XL, Llama 7B, Llama 2 13B Chat+2 more
  • Flan-T5 XL
  • Llama 7B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • SpeechGPT

Multi-turn Semantic Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to elicit unsafe or unethical responses through a chain of semantically relevant multi-turn prompts. The attack, termed "Chain of Attack" (CoA), exploits the model's contextual understanding and adaptive response capabilities to gradually steer the conversation towards the desired harmful output, even if single-turn prompts are rejected due to safety mechanisms. The attack leverages semantic similarity scoring (e.g., using…

Chain of attack: a semantic-driven contextual multi-turn attacker for llm
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, ChatGLM2 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo+2 more
  • Baichuan 2 7B Chat
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

LLM Intent Obfuscation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit vulnerabilities when processing complex or ambiguous prompts containing malicious intent. The vulnerability arises from the LLMs' inability to consistently detect maliciousness when prompts are obfuscated by either splitting a single malicious query into multiple parts or by directly modifying the malicious content to increase ambiguity. This allows attackers to bypass built-in safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or restricted content.

Can LLMs Deeply Detect Complex Malicious Queries? A Framework for Jailbreaking via Obfuscating Intent
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B Chat, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+1 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Qwen Max

Momentum-Boosted LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A momentum-accelerated gradient-based attack (MAC) against Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly improves the efficiency and success rate of jailbreak attacks. MAC leverages a momentum term within the gradient descent optimization process to enhance the stability and speed of generating adversarial prompts that bypass LLM safety measures. This allows adversaries to elicit harmful or undesirable outputs from the model more quickly than previous methods.

Boosting jailbreak attack with momentum
Evaluated models: Vicuna 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.