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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

Latest research findings

959 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to efficient adversarial attacks using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on a continuously relaxed input prompt. This attack bypasses existing alignment methods by crafting adversarial prompts that induce the model to produce undesired or harmful outputs, significantly faster than previous state-of-the-art discrete optimization methods. The effectiveness stems from carefully controlling the error introduced by the continuous relaxation of the discrete…

Attacking large language models with projected gradient descent
Affects: Falcon 7B, Falcon 7B Instruct, Vicuna 7B v1.3

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an indirect jailbreak attack, termed "Puzzler," which leverages implicit clues instead of explicit malicious intent in prompts. By providing associated behaviors or hints related to a malicious query, Puzzler elicits malicious responses from the LLM, bypassing its safety mechanisms. The attack works by first obtaining "defensive measures" from the LLM against a target malicious action, then querying for the corresponding "offensive measures" that…

Play guessing game with llm: Indirect jailbreak attack with implicit clues
Affects: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in multi-agent environments are vulnerable to "infectious jailbreak," where a single adversarial image injected into the memory of one agent can cause nearly all agents to exhibit harmful behaviors exponentially fast through agent-to-agent interaction. The adversarial image acts as a "virus," spreading via pairwise chats without further attacker intervention.

Agent smith: A single image can jailbreak one million multimodal llm agents exponentially fast
Affects: GPT-4V, InstructBLIP, LLaVA 1.5

Source: arXiv

A novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning (GBTL) algorithm allows adversaries to inject backdoor triggers into instruction-tuning datasets for Large Language Models (LLMs). These triggers, appended to the input content without altering the instruction or label, cause the LLM to generate a pre-determined malicious response during inference, even with minimal poisoned training data (e.g., 1%). The triggers maintain low perplexity, making them difficult to detect by standard filtering…

Learning to poison large language models during instruction tuning
Affects: Flan-T5 11B, Flan-T5 3B, Llama 2 13B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to black-box identity verification attacks using Targeted Random Adversarial Prompts (TRAP). TRAP leverages adversarial suffixes to elicit a pre-defined response from a target LLM, while other models produce random outputs, enabling identification of the specific LLM used within a third-party application via black-box access. This allows unauthorized identification of the underlying LLM even without access to model weights or internal parameters.

TRAP: Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt Honeypot for Black-Box Identification
Affects: Claude 2.1, Claude Instant 1.2, GPT-3.5 Turbo +12 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-round "Contextual Interaction Attack" where a series of benign preliminary questions, crafted to be semantically aligned with a malicious target query, are used to manipulate the LLM's context vector. The autoregressive nature of LLMs causes them to incorporate previous conversation rounds into their generation process, allowing the attacker to prime the model into providing harmful information in response to the final, seemingly benign…

Leveraging the Context through Multi-Round Interactions for Jailbreaking Attacks
Affects: Claude 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/28/2024

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack using crafted images (image Jailbreaking Prompts or imgJPs). These imgJPs, when presented as input alongside malicious prompts, cause the MLLM to bypass safety mechanisms and generate objectionable content, including instructions for harmful activities like identity theft or creation of violent video games. The attack demonstrates both prompt-universality (a single imgJP works across multiple prompts) and, to a…

Jailbreaking attack against multimodal large language model
Affects: InstructBLIP, MiniGPT-4, MiniGPT-v2 +3 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety and ethical protocols through a novel code injection technique using personalized encryption and decryption functions. The attack leverages the LLMs' code execution capabilities to process encrypted malicious instructions, circumventing the intent security recognition mechanism.

Codechameleon: Personalized encryption framework for jailbreaking large language models
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4-1106, Llama 2 13B Chat +4 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to DrAttack, a jailbreaking technique that decomposes malicious prompts into semantically neutral sub-prompts. The sub-prompts are then implicitly reconstructed by the LLM through in-context learning using benign examples, evading safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful responses. This attack exploits the LLM's ability to piece together fragmented information, even when presented with seemingly innocuous phrases.

Drattack: Prompt decomposition and reconstruction makes powerful llm jailbreakers
Affects: Claude 1, Claude 2, Gemini Pro +6 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector, termed "RAG Poisoning," where malicious content is injected into the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM via prompt manipulation. This allows attackers to elicit undesirable or malicious outputs from the LLM, bypassing its safety filters. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the retrieved information during response generation.

Pandora: Jailbreak gpts by retrieval augmented generation poisoning
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.