Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

337 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Clinical LLM Feature Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A detection bypass vulnerability in the 2-Sigma clinical training platform allows users to evade the system's two-layer, linguistic-feature-based jailbreak detection mechanism. The detection framework relies heavily on four surface-level linguistic features (Professionalism, Medical Relevance, Ethical Behavior, and Contextual Distraction) to classify malicious inputs. Attackers can bypass these filters by crafting prompts that maintain professional tone and apparent medical relevance but…

Detecting Jailbreak Attempts in Clinical Training LLMs Through Automated Linguistic Feature Extraction
Evaluated models: Not reported

Image Editing Visual Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Image Editing Models (LIEMs) supporting vision-prompt editing are vulnerable to Vision-Centric Jailbreak Attacks (VJA). This vulnerability arises from a modality mismatch in safety alignment: while safeguards primarily analyze textual instructions for policy violations, the underlying models are capable of interpreting and executing instructions embedded directly within the visual input (e.g., typographic text drawn on the image, arrows, symbols, or specific markings). An attacker can…

When the Prompt Becomes Visual: Vision-Centric Jailbreak Attacks for Large Image Editing Models
Evaluated models: GPT Image 1.5, Gemini 3 Pro Image, Seedream 4.5+5 more
  • GPT Image 1.5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Image
  • Seedream 4.5
  • Qwen-Image-Edit-2512
  • Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe
  • BAGEL 14B
  • Flux 2.0 Dev 32B
  • LongCat-Image-Edit

RAG Knowledgebase Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to iterative knowledge-extraction attacks designed to reconstruct the underlying private knowledge base. The vulnerability exists due to the decoupled optimization of the retrieval and generation phases. Attackers can craft adversarial queries consisting of two distinct components: an "Information" component (optimized via gradient descent or random sampling to steer embeddings toward specific, diverse regions of the vector space) and…

Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Adaptive Web Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) based web agents (such as those built using the BrowserUse scaffold) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks when autonomously navigating and processing untrusted web content. Unlike standard Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), this vulnerability occurs when the LLM orchestrator consumes the DOM or visual screenshots of a webpage containing concealed or contextually disguised adversarial instructions. The LLM interprets these embedded text strings as…

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct

Dynamic Backtracking Failure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) aligned via standard Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) or Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) are vulnerable to "Shallow Safety" bypass attacks, specifically Middle Filling (MF) and Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attacks. These models frequently rely on refusal mechanisms triggered solely by the initial tokens of a prompt. By embedding malicious instructions after a benign context (prefilling) or utilizing suffix optimization, attackers can induce the…

Reinforcement Learning with Backtracking Feedback
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3 8B Instruct+2 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B IT

Personalized Agent Double Agent

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenClaw is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), Tool-Return Manipulation, and Persistent Memory Poisoning. The agent incorporates untrusted external content (e.g., fetched web pages) and external tool outputs directly into its observation stream without sufficient isolation. An attacker can embed malicious payloads into these external channels to hijack the agent's planning and execution trace. This allows the attacker to silently trigger high-privilege actions via OpenClaw's Skills…

From Assistant to Double Agent: Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks on OpenClaw for Personalized Local AI Agent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Untrusted Content Agent Overrule

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Tool-calling LLM agents are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks that induce "Poisoned Chain-of-Thought (CoT)" persistence. When an attacker embeds fake system constraints or error traces into untrusted external content (e.g., tool outputs or retrieved documents), the agent may generate reasoning traces that accept these malicious constraints as ground truth. Even if the original injected input is later sanitized or removed, the residual poisoned reasoning traces remain in the…

CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4+1 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 3 Pro

Persistent Agent Context Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Conventional LLM agent architectures suffer from a working memory contamination vulnerability due to indiscriminate memory accumulation. When these agents retrieve external data via tools (e.g., web search, reading emails), the entire raw output is appended directly to their continuous context window. If the external data contains an Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) payload, the malicious instruction persists in the agent's working memory across its entire multi-step reasoning workflow. This…

AgentSys: Secure and Dynamic LLM Agents Through Explicit Hierarchical Memory Management
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-5.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5.1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Clinical Prompt Injection Harm

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems deployed in clinical workflows are vulnerable to direct and indirect (RAG-mediated) medical prompt injection attacks. Attackers can embed malicious instructions within user queries or external retrieved documents (such as poisoned clinical guidelines or PDFs). By exploiting "authority framing" (e.g., formatting the payload as a clinical guideline update or an editor's note), the injections successfully bypass generic…

MPIB: A Benchmark for Medical Prompt Injection Attacks and Clinical Safety in LLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct+10 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Mixtral 8x22B v0.1
  • MedGemma 4B
  • MedGemma 27B
  • Meditron 7B
  • Meditron 70B
  • BioMistral 7B
  • MMed-Llama 3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.