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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agent-in-the-Middle Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the communication mechanisms of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) enabling an Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack. An attacker can intercept and manipulate messages between agents, causing the victim agent to produce malicious outputs. The attack does not require compromising individual agents directly; instead, it leverages contextual manipulation of inter-agent communications.

Red-Teaming LLM Multi-Agent Systems via Communication Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o

ICL Permutation Exploit

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing In-Context Learning (ICL) are vulnerable to demonstration permutation attacks due to inherent sensitivity to the ordering of input examples. This vulnerability arises from the limitations of unidirectional attention mechanisms and standard Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) training, which fails to account for worst-case input permutations. An attacker can exploit this by permuting the order of valid, semantically correct few-shot…

PEARL: Towards permutation-resilient LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Gemma 7B

Iterative Chaos Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, "Mousetrap," which leverages the models' reasoning capabilities to elicit harmful responses. Mousetrap uses a "Chaos Machine" to iteratively transform prompts via one-to-one mappings (e.g., character substitutions, word reversals), creating complex reasoning chains that confuse the LRM and cause it to generate unsafe outputs despite safety mechanisms. The iterative nature of the attack, combined with role-playing…

A Mousetrap: Fooling Large Reasoning Models for Jailbreak with Chain of Iterative Chaos
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking, o1-mini

Prefix-Tree Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured output interfaces are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the interaction between token-level inference and sentence-level safety alignment. Attackers can manipulate the model's output by constructing attack patterns based on prefixes of safety refusal responses and desired harmful outputs, effectively bypassing safety mechanisms through iterative API calls and constrained decoding. This allows the generation of harmful content despite…

Exploiting Prefix-Tree in Structured Output Interfaces for Enhancing Jailbreak Attacking
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B, Llama 2 13B+5 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 14B Chat
  • Qwen 7B Chat

Agentic Prompt Leakage Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) where insufficient sanitization of system prompts allows attackers to extract sensitive information embedded within those prompts. Attackers can use an agentic approach, employing multiple interacting LLMs (as demonstrated in the referenced research), to iteratively refine prompts and elicit confidential data from the target LLM's responses. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the LLM's ability to infer context from seemingly innocuous…

Automating Prompt Leakage Attacks on Large Language Models Using Agentic Approach
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini

Adversarial VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

Context-Coherent LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A context-coherent jailbreak attack (CCJA) allows bypassing safety mechanisms in aligned large language models (LLMs) by optimizing perturbations in the continuous word embedding space of a masked language model (MLM). The attack leverages the MLM's ability to reconstruct text from hidden states to generate semantically coherent yet malicious prompts that induce the target LLM to produce unsafe outputs, even with strong safety alignment. The attack's effectiveness is enhanced by using a seed…

CCJA: Context-Coherent Jailbreak Attack for Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Guanaco 13B, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

LLM Watermark Neutralization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) watermarking schemes based on n-gram probability biases (specifically KGW, SynthID-Text, MinHash, and SkipHash) are vulnerable to adversarial removal during Knowledge Distillation. When a student model is trained on the output of a watermarked teacher model, it inherits the watermark's statistical biases ("radioactivity"). An attacker can exploit this inheritance by comparing the student model's output token probabilities against a base model to extract the…

Can LLM Watermarks Robustly Prevent Unauthorized Knowledge Distillation?
Evaluated models: GLM 4 9B Chat, Llama 7B, Llama 3.2 1B

Learned Instruction Rewriting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "Rewrite to Jailbreak" (R2J) attacks. R2J exploits the models' safety mechanisms by iteratively rewriting harmful prompts, subtly altering wording to bypass safety filters while maintaining the original malicious intent. This differs from previous methods which rely on adding extraneous prefixes/suffixes or creating forced instruction-following scenarios, thus being more difficult to detect.

Rewrite to Jailbreak: Discover Learnable and Transferable Implicit Harmfulness Instruction
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.