Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agent System Orchestration Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent systems (MAS) utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) orchestration are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking via indirect prompt injection, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability arises when a sub-agent (e.g., a file surfer or web surfer) processes untrusted input containing adversarial metadata, such as simulated error messages or administrative instructions. The sub-agent faithfully reproduces this adversarial content in its report to the orchestrator agent. The…

Multi-agent systems execute arbitrary malicious code
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash

Bleeding Pathways Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from a dynamic discriminative degradation vulnerability during sequence generation. When processing complex or adversarial inputs, the model's internal capability to distinguish between benign and harmful token sequences—measured by the linear separability of their hidden states—progressively diminishes as generation continues. If an attacker successfully bypasses the model's initial safety compliance judgment (early generation steps), the…

Bleeding Pathways: Vanishing Discriminability in LLM Hidden States Fuels Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct+7 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Phi-4 14B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • Zephyr 7B Beta

Autonomous Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that exploit incremental policy erosion. The attacker uses a breadth-first search strategy to generate multiple prompts at each turn, leveraging partial compliance from previous responses to gradually escalate the conversation towards eliciting disallowed outputs. Minor concessions accumulate, ultimately leading to complete circumvention of safety measures.

Siege: Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models with Tree Search
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B

Cyber Fine-Tuning Undermines Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on the CyberLLMInstruct dataset results in a critical degradation of safety alignment and refusal mechanisms. While the dataset comprises "pseudo-malicious" content (educational descriptions of malware, phishing, and exploits without executable payloads), the Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) process on this corpus causes the models to generalize this instruction-following behavior to actual malicious requests. This effectively bypasses safety guardrails…

CyberLLMInstruct: A new dataset for analysing safety of fine-tuned LLMs using cyber security data
Evaluated models: Llama 2 70B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Phi-3 Mini 3.8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

LLM Fuzz-Based Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks by crafted prompts that bypass safety mechanisms, causing the model to generate harmful or unethical content. This vulnerability stems from the inherent tension between the LLM's instruction-following and safety constraints. The JBFuzz technique demonstrates the ability to efficiently and effectively discover such prompts through a fuzzing-based approach leveraging novel seed prompt templates and a synonym-based mutation strategy.

JBFuzz: Jailbreaking LLMs Efficiently and Effectively Using Fuzzing
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Flash+6 more
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Latent Subspace Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) where the model's internal representations (activations) in specific latent subspaces can be manipulated to trigger jailbreak responses. By calculating a perturbation vector based on the difference between the mean activations of "safe" and "jailbroken" states, an attacker can introduce a targeted perturbation to the model's activations, causing it to generate unsafe outputs even when presented with a safe prompt. This manipulates the…

Probing Latent Subspaces in LLM for AI Security: Identifying and Manipulating Adversarial States
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Unchallenged Premise Misinformation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to implicit misinformation propagation due to sycophantic compliance with false premises. When a user prompt embeds a factually incorrect assumption or conspiracy theory as an unchallenged premise (implicit presupposition) rather than asking for verification, the model frequently fails to detect the falsehood. Instead of correcting the user, the model hallucinates a response that accepts, validates, and reinforces the false premise. This…

How to Protect Yourself from 5G Radiation? Investigating LLM Responses to Implicit Misinformation
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+11 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.3 70B

Dialogue History Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Dialogue Injection Attacks (DIA), where malicious actors manipulate the chat history to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unethical responses. DIA exploits the LLM's chat template structure to inject crafted dialogue into the input, even in black-box scenarios where the model's internals are unknown. Two attack methods are presented: one adapts gray-box prefilling attacks, the other leverages deferred responses to increase the…

Dialogue Injection Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs through Context Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B, Gemma 2 9B+8 more
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 11B
  • Qwen 2 7B

MLM Adaptive RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that allows for black-box adversarial attacks known as "CtrlRAG." This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting maliciously crafted inputs into the system's knowledge base. Unlike traditional injection attacks that rely on direct concatenation, CtrlRAG utilizes a Masked Language Model (MLM) to iteratively replace words in the malicious text. This optimization ensures…

CtrlRAG: Black-box Document Poisoning Attacks for Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+2 more
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1

Probabilistic Multimodal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Jailbreak-Probability-based Attacks (JPA). JPA leverages a Jailbreak Probability Prediction Network (JPPN) to identify and optimize adversarial perturbations in input images, maximizing the probability of eliciting harmful responses from the MLLM, even with small perturbation bounds and few iterations. The attack operates by modifying the input image's hidden states within the MLLM to increase the predicted jailbreak probability.

Utilizing Jailbreak Probability to Attack and Safeguard Multimodal LLMs
Evaluated models: DeepSeek VL 1.3B, InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B, InternLM XComposer+2 more
  • DeepSeek VL 1.3B
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B
  • InternLM XComposer
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • Qwen VL Chat

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.