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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Combined Malicious Code Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mainstream Large Language Models (LLMs), including DeepSeek-R1, GPT-4o, Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, and Qwen-Coder, are vulnerable to black-box jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms to generate functional malicious code. The vulnerability is exploited through specific prompt engineering techniques, most notably "Benign Expression" (substituting malicious keywords with harmless synonyms) and "DRA" (Decomposed Requirement Attack), which conceal malicious intent within seemingly…

LLMs Caught in the Crossfire: Malware Requests and Jailbreak Challenges
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620, GPT-4o Preview 20240801, GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18+26 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620
  • GPT-4o Preview 20240801
  • GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18
  • GPT-4o No-Safe Preview 20240801
  • o1 Preview 20240912
  • Qwen Coder Turbo 20240919
  • Qwen Max 20240919
  • Qwen Plus 20240919
  • Qwen Turbo 20240919
  • SparkDesk v4.0
  • CodeGen Multi 350M
  • StarCoder2 3B
  • CodeGeeX2 6B
  • CodeGen25 Instruct 7B
  • CodeLlama 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 7B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • StarCoder2 15B
  • WizardCoder v1 15B
  • StarCoder 15.5B
  • DeepSeek Coder V2 Lite 16B
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B Instruct
  • Wizard v1.1 33B
  • CodeLlama 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large Instruct 2407 123B
  • DeepSeek Chat V2 236B
  • DeepSeek Coder V2 Instruct 0724 236B
  • DeepSeek R1 671B

JailFlip Implicit Harm

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Qwen Plus
  • Qwen Turbo

Twin Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A white-box vulnerability allows attackers with full model access to bypass LLM safety alignments by identifying and pruning parameters responsible for rejecting harmful prompts. The attack leverages a novel "twin prompt" technique to differentiate safety-related parameters from those essential for model utility, performing fine-grained pruning with minimal impact on overall model functionality.

TwinBreak: Jailbreaking LLM Security Alignments based on Twin Prompts
Evaluated models: DeepSeek 7B, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B+13 more
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Breaking the LLM Reviewer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in automated peer review workflows are vulnerable to targeted textual adversarial attacks. By employing a technique defined as "Attack Focus Localization," an attacker can identify critical document segments via Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) matching between the original text and an initial LLM-generated review. Injecting semantic-preserving perturbations—such as character-level noise, synonym substitution (e.g., TextFooler), or stylistic transfer…

Breaking the Reviewer: Assessing the Vulnerability of Large Language Models in Automated Peer Review Under Textual Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.3 70B, Mistral Large

Chain-of-Code Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for code generation exhibit a vulnerability termed "Chain-of-Code Collapse" (CoCC), where the models fail to generate correct code when presented with semantically faithful but adversarially structured prompts. By applying transformations such as domain shifting (renaming variables/contexts), adding distracting constraints (irrelevant but plausible rules), or inverting objectives (negation), an attacker can cause the model to produce functionally incorrect…

Chain-of-Code Collapse: Reasoning Failures in LLMs via Adversarial Prompting in Code Generation
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.7 Sonnet+5 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • DeepSeek Coder 33B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

LLM Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama-3, Gemma-2, and Qwen2.5, are vulnerable to automated adversarial attacks generated via a Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming (QDRT) framework. This vulnerability arises from the models' inability to robustly defend against attackers trained via behavior-conditioned reinforcement learning that optimize for specific "goal-driven" behaviors. Unlike standard attacks that optimize solely for toxicity, QDRT trains a population of specialized attacker models to…

Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming: Automated Generation of High-Quality and Diverse Attackers for Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Gemma 2 2B IT+5 more
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 2B IT
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct

Bitstream Camouflage Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel black-box attack, dubbed BitBypass, exploits the vulnerability of aligned LLMs by camouflaging harmful prompts using hyphen-separated bitstreams. This bypasses safety alignment mechanisms by transforming sensitive words into their bitstream representations and replacing them with placeholders, in conjunction with a specially crafted system prompt that instructs the LLM to convert the bitstream back to text and respond as if given the original harmful prompt.

BitBypass: A New Direction in Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models with Bitstream Camouflage
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Mixtral 8x22B

Agentic Red-Teaming Uncovers Novel Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking through an agentic attack framework called Composition of Principles (CoP). This technique uses an attacker LLM (Red-Teaming Agent) to dynamically select and combine multiple human-defined, high-level transformations ("principles") into a single, sophisticated prompt. The composition of several simple principles, such as expanding context, rephrasing, and inserting specific phrases, creates complex adversarial prompts that can bypass…

CoP: Agentic Red-teaming for Large Language Models using Composition of Principles
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemma 7B IT+11 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 2
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • o1

Stealthy Unlearning Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in fine-tuning-based large language model (LLM) unlearning allows malicious actors to craft manipulated forgetting requests. By subtly increasing the frequency of common benign tokens within the forgetting data, the attacker can cause the unlearned model to exhibit unintended unlearning behaviors when these benign tokens appear in normal user prompts, leading to a degradation of model utility for legitimate users. This occurs because existing unlearning methods fail to…

Keeping an eye on llm unlearning: The hidden risk and remedy
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B v0.3

Phantom Token User Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize byte-stream parsing or structural extraction to process PDF files—specifically the OpenAI GPT and Anthropic Claude families—are vulnerable to adversarial text injection via imperceptible "phantom tokens." This vulnerability exploits the disconnect between how PDF viewers render documents for humans (visual layer) and how LLMs extract text from the PDF operator stream (data layer). Attackers can manipulate standard PDF text-showing operators (TJ and Tj)…

TRAPDOC: Deceiving LLM Users by Injecting Imperceptible Phantom Tokens into Documents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o4-mini

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.