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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Ciphered Prompt Self-Reconstruction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability, dubbed RoguePrompt, allows for bypassing large language model (LLM) moderation filters by encoding a forbidden instruction into a self-reconstructing payload. The attack uses a dual-layer ciphering process. First, the forbidden prompt is partitioned into two subsequences (e.g., even and odd words). One subsequence is encrypted using a classical cipher like Vigenere, while the other remains plaintext. Both the plaintext subsequence, the Vigenere ciphertext, and natural language…

RoguePrompt: Dual-Layer Ciphering for Self-Reconstruction to Circumvent LLM Moderation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro

Existential Tool Invocation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A safety bypass vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multi-Modal Models (LVLMs) that expose a "Prefix Completion" parameter in their inference APIs (e.g., echo or prefix parameters). The vulnerability exploits the model's autoregressive nature, where the model prioritizes local coherence with a user-supplied output prefix over global safety alignment (RLHF) or system instructions. By supplying a prefix that establishes a hostile narrative or intent (e.g., "My actions are as…

Can LLMs Threaten Human Survival? Benchmarking Potential Existential Threats from LLMs via Prefix Completion
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Qwen 2.5 7B

Template and Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for safety alignment bypass through an advanced jailbreaking technique called Template and Suffix Optimization (TASO). The attack combines two distinct optimization methods in an alternating, iterative feedback loop. First, a semantically meaningless adversarial suffix is optimized (e.g., using gradient-based methods like GCG) to force the LLM to begin its response with an affirmative phrase (e.g., "Sure, here is...")…

TASO: Jailbreak LLMs via Alternative Template and Suffix Optimization
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B, Baichuan 2 7B, DeepSeek 7B+27 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B
  • Baichuan 2 7B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Orca 2 7B
  • Qwen 14B
  • Qwen 32B
  • Qwen 72B
  • Qwen 7B
  • Solar 10.7B
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Zephyr 7B

LLM App Malicious Drift

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper restriction of the "Capability Space" in Large Language Model (LLM) applications allows remote attackers to manipulate application behavior through "Goal Deviation" attacks. This vulnerability arises when developers rely on the broad capabilities of a foundational model (e.g., GPT-4, LLaMA) without implementing sufficient negative constraints or disabling default plugins (e.g., DALL-E, Web Search) in the system prompt. Attackers can exploit this via natural language inputs to trigger…

Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries
Evaluated models: Not reported

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Game-Theoretic LLM Defection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a black-box jailbreak technique known as the "Game-Theory Attack" (GTA). This vulnerability exploits the model's instruction-following and objective-shaping capabilities by framing the interaction as a finite-horizon sequential stochastic game. By introducing a game-theoretic scenario template—specifically a "Mechanism-Induced Graded Prisoner’s Dilemma"—the attacker alters the model's effective payoff structure. The vulnerability triggers a…

" To Survive, I Must Defect": Jailbreaking LLMs via the Game-Theory Scenarios
Evaluated models: Not reported

Indirect Environmental Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen3-VL Plus
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4.5
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

LLM Agent Automates Backdoor Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the fine-tuning process of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for the automated generation of stealthy backdoor attacks using an autonomous LLM agent. This method, termed AutoBackdoor, creates a pipeline to generate semantically coherent trigger phrases and corresponding poisoned instruction-response pairs. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that rely on fixed, often anomalous triggers, this technique produces natural language triggers that are contextually relevant and…

AutoBackdoor: Automating Backdoor Attacks via LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Adversarial Poetry Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) from multiple vendors are vulnerable to a "poetic jailbreak" attack, a form of stylistic obfuscation where safety guardrails are bypassed by formatting harmful requests as poetry. By encoding prohibited instructions (e.g., malware creation, CBRN protocols) into verse—utilizing metaphors, rhyme schemes, and rhythmic structure—an attacker can evade intent recognition heuristics. The model perceives the input primarily as a creative writing constraint rather than a…

Adversarial Poetry as a Universal Single-Turn Jailbreak Mechanism in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat V3.1, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, Qwen 3 32B+22 more
  • DeepSeek Chat V3.1
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Kimi K2
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Magistral Medium 2506
  • Qwen 3 Max
  • Mistral Large 2411
  • Mistral Small 3.2 24B Instruct
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • Grok 4 Fast
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Grok 4
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • Claude Haiku 4.5

Conceptual Triggers Bypass Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models are vulnerable to a conceptual manipulation attack, termed Morphology Inspired Conceptual Manipulation (MICM), that bypasses standard safety filters to generate content aligned with harmful extremist ideologies. The attack does not use explicit keywords or standard jailbreak syntax. Instead, it embeds a curated set of seemingly innocuous phrases, called Concept-embedded Triggers (CETs), into a prompt template. These CETs represent an abstract "conceptual configuration" of…

When Harmless Words Harm: A New Threat to LLM Safety via Conceptual Triggers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-4o+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.