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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

337 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Prompt Injection Alignment Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

MAS Link Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The evaluated MetaGPT multi-agent systems are vulnerable to "Web Fraud Attacks" due to insufficient semantic and structural validation of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) by agentic models. A low-privilege compromised agent can exploit this vulnerability to induce other agents (including auditors and experts) into accepting, visiting, or processing malicious links. The vulnerability leverages the LLM's inability to distinguish between benign and malicious link structures when obfuscation…

Web fraud attacks against llm-driven multi-agent systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek Reasoner+1 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Llama 3 8B

Universal Prompt Disables Guardrails

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A universal prompt injection vulnerability, termed "Involuntary Jailbreak," affects multiple large language models. The attack uses a single prompt that instructs the model to learn a pattern from abstract string operators (X and Y). The model is then asked to generate its own examples of questions that should be refused (harmful questions) and provide detailed, non-refusal answers to them, in order to satisfy the learned operator logic. This reframes the generation of harmful content as a…

Involuntary Jailbreak
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Claude Opus 4+29 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 3 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Fast
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Grok 4
  • Grok 4.1
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Mistral Small 24B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 Coder 480B-A35B Instruct

MDH: Hybrid Jailbreak Detection Strategy

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models that support a developer role in their API are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that leverages malicious developer messages. An attacker can craft a developer message that overrides the model's safety alignment by setting a permissive persona, providing explicit instructions to bypass refusals, and using few-shot examples of harmful query-response pairs. This technique, named D-Attack, is effective on its own. A more advanced variant, DH-CoT, enhances the attack by…

Jailbreaking Commercial Black-Box LLMs with Explicitly Harmful Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1+13 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • o1-mini
  • o1
  • o3-mini
  • o3
  • o4-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • DeepSeek R1

Physical Patch Driving Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) employed in autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a physically realizable adversarial patch attack dubbed "PhysPatch." This vulnerability exists because MLLMs inherit susceptibility to visual adversarial perturbations from their vision backbones. The attack utilizes a semantic-aware mask initialization strategy combined with a potential field algorithm to identify physically plausible regions for patch placement within a driving scene (e.g…

PhysPatch: A Physically Realizable and Transferable Adversarial Patch Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models-based Autonomous Driving Systems
Evaluated models: LLaVA v1.6 13B, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct+8 more
  • LLaVA v1.6 13B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 VL Max
  • o3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • QVQ-Plus

Graph-LLM Template Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Benign Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio-Language Models (ALMs) including Qwen2.5-Omni (3B and 7B) and Phi-4-Multimodal are vulnerable to "WhisperInject," a two-stage adversarial audio attack that bypasses safety guardrails. The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject imperceptible perturbations into benign audio inputs (e.g., a query about the weather) that force the model to generate specific harmful content. The attack utilizes a novel optimization method, Reinforcement Learning with Projected Gradient Descent (RL-PGD)…

When Good Sounds Go Adversarial: Jailbreaking Audio-Language Models with Benign Inputs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 Omni 3B, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B, Phi-4 Multimodal+2 more
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B
  • Phi-4 Multimodal
  • Gemma 3n E2B
  • Gemma 3n E4B

Stealthy Multi-Round Communication Tampering

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) where an attacker with control over the communication network can perform a multi-round, adaptive, and stealthy message tampering attack. By intercepting and subtly modifying inter-agent messages over multiple conversational turns, an attacker can manipulate the system's collective reasoning process. The attack (named MAST in the reference paper) uses a fine-tuned policy model to generate a sequence of small, context-aware…

Attack the Messages, Not the Agents: A Multi-round Adaptive Stealthy Tampering Framework for LLM-MAS
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+3 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Autonomous LLMs Jailbreak Models

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) can be instructed via a single system prompt to act as autonomous adversarial agents. These agents engage in multi-turn persuasive dialogues to systematically bypass the safety mechanisms of target language models. The LRM autonomously plans and executes the attack by initiating a benign conversation and gradually escalating the harmfulness of its requests, thereby circumventing defenses that are not robust to sustained, context-aware persuasive attacks. This…

Large Reasoning Models Are Autonomous Jailbreak Agents
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3+11 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • o4-mini
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B

Full-Spectrum Diffusion Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A targeted adversarial attack vulnerability exists in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) susceptible to Adversarial-Guided Diffusion (AGD). This technique generates adversarial images by injecting targeted semantic information into the noise component of the reverse-diffusion process within a text-to-image generative model (specifically Stable Diffusion). Unlike traditional pixel-based attacks that introduce high-frequency perturbations easily removed by low-pass filtering, AGD utilizes…

Adversarial-guided diffusion for multimodal llm attacks
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.