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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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19 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically variants of GPT-4o, DeepSeek-R1, OLMo-2, and Llama-4, are vulnerable to accelerated adaptive adversarial attacks due to excessive information leakage in observable output signals. When these models expose "thinking processes" (Chain-of-Thought traces) or token-level log-probabilities (logits) to the end user, they leak significant mutual information $I(Z;T)$ regarding the model's safety state or hidden instructions. This leakage allows adaptive attack…

Bits Leaked per Query: Information-Theoretic Bounds on Adversarial Attacks against LLMs
Affects: DeepSeek R1, GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18, Llama 4 Maverick 17B +4 more

Source: arXiv

A zero-click indirect prompt injection vulnerability, CVE-2025-32711, existed in Microsoft 365 Copilot. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exfiltrate sensitive data from a victim's session by sending a crafted email. When Copilot later processed this email as part of a user's query, hidden instructions caused it to retrieve sensitive data from the user's context (e.g., other emails, documents) and embed it into a URL. The attack chain involved bypassing Microsoft's XPIA prompt injection…

EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM System

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) inference APIs that expose top-k logits or log-probabilities are vulnerable to model extraction and cloning. An attacker can execute a two-stage attack to replicate the proprietary model without access to weights, gradients, or training data. First, by submitting fewer than 10,000 random queries and aggregating the returned unrounded logits, the attacker recovers the model's output projection matrix using Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). Second, the attacker…

Clone What You Can't Steal: Black-Box LLM Replication via Logit Leakage and Distillation
Affects: GPT-3.5, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Multi-tenant Large Language Model (LLM) inference systems utilizing global Key-Value (KV) cache sharing are vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. By measuring the Time-To-First-Token (TTFT) latency of crafted API requests, an unprivileged remote attacker can determine if specific token sequences have been previously processed and cached by the system for other users. This observable timing difference between cache hits (low TTFT) and cache misses (high TTFT) allows for the token-by-token…

Selective KV-Cache Sharing to Mitigate Timing Side-Channels in LLM Inference
Affects: Phi-4 14B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B, Qwen 3 32B +3 more

Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs), such as GitHub Copilot and Amazon Q, are vulnerable to jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks due to their unique workflows and reliance on proprietary code datasets. Jailbreaking attacks exploit the LLM's ability to generate harmful content by embedding malicious prompts within various code components (filenames, comments, variable names, function calls). Training data extraction attacks leverage the LLM's tendency to…

Security Attacks on LLM-based Code Completion Tools
Affects: GPT 3.5-turbo-0125, GPT-4 Turbo-2024-04-09, GPT-4o-2024-05-13

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can bypass their internal copyright compliance mechanisms, causing them to generate verbatim copyrighted text. The vulnerability stems from insufficient robustness against prompt engineering techniques that manipulate the model into ignoring or circumventing its safety filters designed for copyright protection.

SHIELD: Evaluation and Defense Strategies for Copyright Compliance in LLM Text Generation
Affects: Claude 3 Haiku, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini Pro +5 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/28/2024

A prompt injection vulnerability in OpenAI's custom GPT models allows attackers to extract the system prompt and potentially leak user-uploaded files. Attackers craft malicious prompts that manipulate the LLM into revealing sensitive information, even when defensive prompts are in place. The vulnerability is exacerbated when the model includes a code interpreter.

Assessing prompt injection risks in 200+ custom gpts

Source: arXiv

A system prompt leakage vulnerability in GPT-4V allows extraction of internal system prompts through carefully crafted, incomplete conversations combined with image input. Extracted prompts can be used as highly effective jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety restrictions and leading to undesirable outputs, including revealing personally identifiable information from images.

Jailbreaking gpt-4v via self-adversarial attacks with system prompts
Affects: GPT-4, GPT-4V, LLaVA 1.5

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.