Impact
Issues affecting data confidentiality and integrity
16 matching entries out of 171 in this category
The authors report historical isolation failures in client-held encrypted reasoning blocks across compatible provider API contexts.
Source: arXiv
The MTGuard study evaluates unsafe Model Context Protocol tool calls originating from compromised server data, host-side execution changes, and malicious user-controlled resources. Its hybrid monitor combines pre-execution parameter inspection, behavioral observation, and post-execution result verification across browser-automation and financial-analysis agents.
Source: arXiv
The paper reports a reproducible black-box evaluation showing that adversarial user queries can cause deployed LLM applications to reveal hidden system prompts. In the authors’ measurement of 1,200 applications across six commercial platforms, 1,064 applications leaked prompt content (81.0%–93.5% per anonymized platform). This is a paper-reported result, not independently verified here. LeakBench and the official artifact repository provide defensive benchmark materials for controlled testing…
Source: arXiv
OpenClaw is vulnerable to persistent memory poisoning, allowing an attacker to manipulate the agent's long-term memory store (MEMORY.md) via prompt injection. Because the autonomous agent continuously integrates this memory file as context for all subsequent reasoning and task planning, injected payloads act as durable behavioral constraints. This allows an attacker to persistently alter the agent's core policy, manipulate tool selection, and hijack future sessions without any further…
Source: arXiv
Agentic Large Language Model (LLM) systems utilizing persistent memory, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines, and external tool connectors are vulnerable to Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI). An attacker can inject obfuscated (e.g., encoded, structurally nested, or semantically reframed) payloads into external memory stores or RAG documents. These payloads bypass conventional inference-time plaintext content filters, persist across session boundaries, and remain dormant…
Source: arXiv
Large Language Models (LLMs) hosted on inference servers are vulnerable to high-speed weight exfiltration attacks due to the inherent compressibility of transformer parameters when decompression constraints are relaxed. Adversaries with compromised server access can utilize aggressive lossy compression techniques—specifically additive quantization combined with k-means clustering—to reduce model size by factors of 16x to 100x (e.g., <1 bit per parameter). Unlike standard quantization for…
Source: arXiv
A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments and multi-agent systems where an autonomous attacker agent can systematically extract hidden system prompts through self-evolving interaction strategies. The vulnerability leverages a "JustAsk" framework which utilizes Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) exploration to dynamically select and refine attack vectors from a hierarchical taxonomy of 14 atomic skills (e.g., structural formatting, authority appeals) and 14 multi-turn…
Source: arXiv
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) specification v1.0 contains fundamental architectural vulnerabilities enabling server-side prompt injection and privilege escalation. The protocol relies on bidirectional sampling (sampling/createMessage) without cryptographic origin authentication or UI distinction, allowing connected servers to inject content that the LLM backend interprets as legitimate user input. Additionally, the protocol lacks isolation boundaries between concurrent server connections…
Source: arXiv
Production Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to long-form training data extraction via a two-phase prompt injection attack. This vulnerability allows an attacker to recover substantial portions of memorized, copyrighted text (such as novels) by exploiting the model's autoregressive text completion capabilities. The attack methodology involves two distinct phases: 1. Prefix Completion Probe: The attacker provides a short "seed" sequence (e.g., the first sentence of a book) coupled…
Source: arXiv
A black-box guardrail reverse-engineering vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) serving systems that employ output filtering mechanisms. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to replicate the proprietary decision-making policy and rule sets of the target's safety guardrail without direct access to model parameters. This is achieved through a technique termed Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack (GRA), which utilizes a reinforcement learning framework combined with genetic…
Source: arXiv