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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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337 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Autonomous Jailbreak Evolution

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an automated, self-evolving jailbreak attack framework known as ASTRA (Automated Strategy Discovery, Retrieval, and Evolution). This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment mechanisms (such as RLHF) fail to generalize defenses against dynamically distilled and retrieved attack strategies. ASTRA operates on a closed-loop "attack-evaluate-distill-reuse" mechanism. An attacker LLM generates prompts; a separate strategy extractor…

ASTRA: An Automated Framework for Strategy Discovery, Retrieval, and Evolution for Jailbreaking LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct, DeepSeek R1 0528+5 more
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • GPT-4o 2024-08-06
  • GPT-4.1 2025-04-14
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash 001
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview 04-17
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet 20250219

Latent Space Discontinuity Exploitation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Mobile Agent Channel Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile LLM-based agents (including Mobile-Agent-E, AppAgent, AutoDroid, and others) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks delivered via untrusted third-party mobile channels, such as in-app advertisements, system notifications, and embedded webviews. These agents utilize Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to perceive the device state via screenshots or accessibility trees. The vulnerability exists because the agents concatenate the user's prompt ($p$) with the environmental…

Measuring the Security of Mobile LLM Agents under Adversarial Prompts from Untrusted Third-Party Channels
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Mini

Internal Prompt Leak Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based coding agents integrated into IDEs (e.g., VS Code Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf) are vulnerable to a query-agnostic Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attack termed "QueryIPI." This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the developer's machine by injecting a malicious tool definition (e.g., via the Model Context Protocol) into the agent's context.

QueryIPI: Query-agnostic Indirect Prompt Injection on Coding Agents
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4

Concurrent Task Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, known as Task Concurrency, exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs). The vulnerability arises when two distinct tasks, one harmful and one benign, are interleaved at the word level within a single prompt. The structure of the malicious prompt alternates words from each task, often using separators like {} to encapsulate words from the second task. This "concurrent" instruction format obfuscates the harmful intent from the model's safety guardrails, causing the…

Adjacent Words, Divergent Intents: Jailbreaking Large Language Models via Task Concurrency
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4.1+7 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B

Persuasive Jailbreak Fingerprint

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that use persuasive techniques grounded in social psychology to bypass safety alignments. Malicious instructions can be reframed using one of Cialdini's seven principles of persuasion (Authority, Reciprocity, Commitment, Social Proof, Liking, Scarcity, and Unity). These rephrased prompts, which remain human-readable and can be generated automatically, manipulate the LLM into complying with harmful requests it would otherwise…

Uncovering the Persuasive Fingerprint of LLMs in Jailbreaking Attacks
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, GPT-2, Phi-4+1 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GPT-2
  • Phi-4
  • WizardLM Uncensored

LLM Data Instruction Override

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) integrated agents and applications are vulnerable to Prompt Injection attacks where untrusted data (e.g., retrieved documents, tool outputs, website content) overrides system instructions. Because LLMs typically process instructions and data within a single context window without strict separation, an attacker can embed imperative commands within the data channel. This vulnerability extends beyond simple overriding instructions; it includes sophisticated techniques…

Defending against prompt injection with datafilter
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Black-Box Confidence Exploit

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the self-reflection and introspection capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-LLMs that allows attackers to perform black-box adversarial optimization using only textual model responses. This technique, termed "Asking for Directions" (AfD), bypasses the need for access to gradients, logits, or continuous confidence scores. The attacker employs a hill-climbing optimization strategy where they present the target model with two candidate inputs (an…

Black-box Optimization of LLM Outputs by Asking for Directions
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct+8 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet

Schema Exploitation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models where their strong adherence to processing structured data schemas can be exploited to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack, named BreakFun, uses a multi-component prompt that combines an innocent framing, a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) instruction, and a core "Trojan Schema." This schema is an adversarially designed data structure (e.g., a Python class definition) that embeds a harmful user request. By instructing the model to simulate the…

BreakFun: Jailbreaking LLMs via Schema Exploitation
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1+11 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • ERNIE 4.5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemma 3 12B
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Kimi K2
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 Max
  • Zephyr 7B

Agent Harassment Escalation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents powered by LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct and Gemini-2.0-flash are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial exploitation that bypasses safety alignment through toxic memory injection, planning scaffolds (Chain-of-Thought/ReAct), and jailbreak fine-tuning. Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, this vulnerability exploits the agentic nature of the system—specifically memory retention and reasoning capabilities—to sustain and escalate harassment over prolonged interactions. When…

Echoes of Human Malice in Agents: Benchmarking LLMs for Multi-Turn Online Harassment Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Gemini 2.0 Flash 001

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.