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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

Latest research findings

959 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Activation steering techniques, such as Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA), systematically erode the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) due to geometric interference within the residual stream. Steering vectors intended to modulate benign or utility-driven behaviors (e.g., sycophancy, openness, self-awareness) often exhibit a negative cosine similarity with the model's latent 1D refusal direction. When applied during inference, these steering vectors inadvertently suppress the…

Analysing the Safety Pitfalls of Steering Vectors
Affects: Llama 2 7B, Qwen 2.5 3B, Gemma 7B

Source: arXiv

LLM-based autonomous email security agents configured with signal-based system prompts are vulnerable to a "signal inversion" attack via infrastructure phishing. When a system prompt instructs an LLM to prioritize a specific heuristic—such as sender-URL domain consistency—attackers can bypass the security filter entirely by registering a single, inexpensive domain and using it for both the sender email address and the malicious payload host. Because the LLM faithfully executes the prioritized…

The System Prompt Is the Attack Surface: How LLM Agent Configuration Shapes Security and Creates Exploitable Vulnerabilities
Affects: Gemini 3 Flash Preview, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4o Mini +8 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to perform a highly transferable Denial-of-Service (DoS) or "blocking" attack. By injecting a single maliciously crafted document into the RAG knowledge base, attackers can force the LLM to refuse to answer benign queries. Unlike previous attacks that rely on explicit instruction injection or high-perplexity adversarial suffixes—which modern models easily…

When Safety Becomes a Vulnerability: Exploiting LLM Alignment Homogeneity for Transferable Blocking in RAG
Affects: GPT-5.2, GPT-5 Mini, DeepSeek V3.2 +4 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by using malicious prompts contextualized in the Thai language and culture. Evaluated models exhibit a significantly higher Attack Success Rate (ASR) against Thai-specific, culturally contextualized attacks compared to general translated attacks. By exploiting local cultural nuances, regional slang, and Thai socio-cultural contexts, attackers can easily circumvent standard…

ThaiSafetyBench: Assessing Language Model Safety in Thai Cultural Contexts
Affects: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +12 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) allows an attacker to propagate covert biases and misalignment across multiple agents via subliminal prompting, an attack vector termed "Thought Virus." By injecting a seemingly benign, semantically unrelated token (such as a specific 3-digit number) into the prompt of a single compromised agent, an attacker can induce a specific targeted behavior (e.g., outputting a specific target concept or decreasing factual truthfulness). This induced…

Thought Virus: Viral Misalignment via Subliminal Prompting in Multi-Agent Systems
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to highly query-efficient black-box jailbreak attacks due to the structural properties of refusal behaviors: skewed token contribution and cross-model consistency. Refusal mechanisms within LLMs are typically triggered by a sparse subset of sensitive tokens rather than the entire prompt, and these refusal representations (specifically the primary left singular vector of the perturbed representation matrix at intermediate layers) are…

Not All Tokens Are Created Equal: Query-Efficient Jailbreak Fuzzing for LLMs
Affects: Gemma 7B Instruct, Gemma 2 9B IT, Llama 3 8B Instruct +6 more

Source: arXiv

A temporal trajectory infilling vulnerability in Text-to-Video (T2V) generative models allows attackers to bypass input and output safety filters to generate policy-violating content. The vulnerability is exploited using a fragmented prompting technique known as Two Frames Matter (TFM). An attacker submits a prompt that specifies only sparse boundary conditions (the start and end frames) using semantically suggestive but lexically benign alternatives, entirely omitting the intermediate action…

Two Frames Matter: A Temporal Attack for Text-to-Video Model Jailbreaking

Source: arXiv

Updated 3/8/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to TAO-Attack, an advanced optimization-based jailbreak that bypasses safety alignments by exploiting gradient-guided token updates. The vulnerability stems from a two-stage loss function combined with a Direction-Priority Token Optimization (DPTO) algorithm. In the first stage, the attack optimizes an adversarial prompt suffix to minimize the probability of refusal signals (e.g., "I cannot") while maximizing the probability of a harmful target…

TAO-Attack: Toward Advanced Optimization-Based Jailbreak Attacks for Large Language Models
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat +4 more

Source: arXiv

LLaVA-v1.5-7B, when deployed as a vision-language autonomous agent, is highly vulnerable to adversarial image perturbations. An attacker can inject imperceptibly modified images into a web environment (such as an e-commerce storefront). When the VLM agent captures a screenshot containing the perturbed image, the visual noise forces the model to misclassify the scene and output incorrect, structured JSON actions. This allows an attacker to hijack the agent's task execution, bypassing the user's…

Adversarial attacks against Modern Vision-Language Models
Affects: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, LLaVA 1.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Updated 4/10/2026

The integration of the visual modality in Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) introduces a vulnerability where appending an image to a harmful text prompt induces a "jailbreak-related representation shift" in the model's internal high-dimensional space. This shift forcibly steers the model's last-token hidden state away from a designated refusal state and into a distinct jailbreak state. The vulnerability occurs because the visual modality overrides the safety alignment of the underlying…

Understanding and Defending VLM Jailbreaks via Jailbreak-Related Representation Shift
Affects: LLaVA 1.5 7B, ShareGPT4V 7B, InternVL-Chat 19B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.