The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Unsafe Culinary Instructions
State-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) and safety guardrails lack domain-specific safety alignment for food science, making them vulnerable to generating actionable, hazardous food safety instructions. Attackers…
Paper-evaluated models(11)
Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 +8 more
- Claude 3.7 Sonnet
- GPT-4o
- GPT-4.1
- GLM-4 32B
- Llama 3.3 70B
- Qwen 2.5 7B
- Qwen 3 8B
- Qwen 3 32B
- Mistral Small 4
- Qwen3Guard
- Llama Guard 4
Description
State-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) and safety guardrails lack domain-specific safety alignment for food science, making them vulnerable to generating actionable, hazardous food safety instructions. Attackers can exploit this alignment sparsity using canonical jailbreak techniques (such as AutoDAN and Persuasive Adversarial Prompting) or direct adversarial prompting to bypass generic safety filters. This allows malicious actors to elicit harmful guidance that violates fundamental FDA regulations. Evaluations show that models are exceptionally susceptible to generating unsafe advice regarding pest control (64.81% average Attack Success Rate), storage, hygiene, and temperature control. Furthermore, general-purpose LLM guardrails systematically overlook these domain-specific risks, exhibiting false negative rates up to 59.71% when processing food-related threats.
Examples
See the FoodGuardBench repository.
Impact
Adversaries or uncritical users can generate and disseminate highly credible but scientifically dangerous food preparation, storage, and pest control instructions. Acting upon these model outputs poses direct threats to human health, including severe cross-contamination, foodborne illnesses, unmitigated exposure to foodborne pathogens, and severe allergic reactions.
Affected Systems
- Foundational LLMs: Claude-3.7-Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, GLM4-32B, LLaMA-3.3-70B, Qwen-2.5-7B, Qwen-3-8B, Qwen-3-32B, Mistral-Small4
- Guardrail Models: Qwen3Guard, LLaMA-Guard 4
Mitigation Steps
- Deploy specialized, domain-specific guardrail models (e.g., FoodGuard-4B) fine-tuned on foundational safety queries anchored in strict regulatory frameworks (like FDA food codes).
- Implement an independent input-output moderation layer specifically trained to recognize latent, context-dependent food science hazards (e.g., temperature danger zones, raw/ready-to-eat cross-contamination) embedded within seemingly benign prompts.
- Expand the core safety alignment (RLHF/DPO) datasets of foundational LLMs to explicitly cover high-stakes, everyday domains like food safety, closing the gap in "mismatched generalization."
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Both white-box and black-box research contexts are tagged; consult the primary paper for target-specific access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Foundational LLMs: Claude-3.7-Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, GLM4-32B, LLaMA-3.3-70B, Qwen-2.5-7B, Qwen-3-8B, Qwen-3-32B, Mistral-Small4 Guardrail Models: Qwen3Guard, LLaMA-Guard 4
Research Paper
Cooking Up Risks: Benchmarking and Reducing Food Safety Risks in Large Language Models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.01444Related research
- Universal Prompt Disables Guardrails
Published August 1, 2025 · model-layer, prompt-layer, injection
- JailFlip Implicit Harm
Published June 1, 2025 · model-layer, prompt-layer, jailbreak
- LLM Judge Manipulation
Published March 1, 2026 · model-layer, application-layer, prompt-layer