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LMVD-ID: 4604ac3b
Paper published September 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Universal Black-Box LLM Jailbreak

A universal black-box jailbreaking vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) due to their susceptibility to adversarial prompts crafted using a genetic algorithm (GA). The GA optimizes a universal…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(2)

  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

A universal black-box jailbreaking vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) due to their susceptibility to adversarial prompts crafted using a genetic algorithm (GA). The GA optimizes a universal adversarial prompt suffix that, when appended to various user inputs, causes the LLM to generate unintended and potentially harmful outputs, bypassing safety mechanisms. This attack requires no knowledge of the LLM's internal architecture or parameters.

Examples

See arXiv:2309.01446 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of benign prompts that, after appending the GA-generated adversarial suffix, elicit harmful responses from the LLaMA 2-7b-chat and Vicuna-7b LLMs. Examples include prompts requesting instructions for illegal activities that were initially refused, but successfully elicited detailed responses after suffix addition.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLMs' safety restrictions and elicit responses that are harmful, malicious, or offensive. This could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, the generation of disinformation, and the facilitation of illegal activities.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects LLMs, such as LLaMA 2-7b-chat and Vicuna-7b, and potentially others susceptible to GA-based adversarial prompt attacks. The attack's success is demonstrated across different LLM architectures and prompting contexts.

Mitigation Steps

  • Robust prompt filtering: Implement more sophisticated prompt filtering mechanisms that can detect and block adversarial suffixes or patterns commonly found in successful attacks.
  • Adversarial training: Employ adversarial training techniques to improve the models’ robustness against malicious prompts.
  • Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) improvements: Refine RLHF techniques to better align the models with safety guidelines and identify and mitigate harmful outputs.
  • Output monitoring and post-processing: Continuously monitor model outputs and use post-processing techniques (e.g., checking for perplexity) to detect and filter undesirable or unsafe responses.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability affects LLMs, such as LLaMA 2-7b-chat and Vicuna-7b, and potentially others susceptible to GA-based adversarial prompt attacks. The attack's success is demonstrated across different LLM architectures…

Research Paper

Open sesame! universal black box jailbreaking of large language models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.01446