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LMVD-ID: 0db119f3
Paper published January 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Surrogate Classifier Extraction

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques for safety embed a "safety classifier" within their architecture. This classifier, responsible for determining whether an input is safe or unsafe, can be…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

Gemma 2 9B IT, Gemma 7B IT, Granite 3.1 8B Instruct +5 more
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Granite 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Zephyr

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques for safety embed a "safety classifier" within their architecture. This classifier, responsible for determining whether an input is safe or unsafe, can be approximated by extracting a surrogate classifier from a subset of the LLM's architecture. Attackers can leverage this surrogate classifier to more effectively craft adversarial inputs (jailbreaks) that bypass the LLM's intended safety mechanisms. The attack success rate against the surrogate classifier is significantly higher than directly attacking the full LLM, requiring fewer computational resources.

Examples

See arXiv:2501.16534 (opens in a new tab). Specific examples of surrogate classifier extraction and subsequent successful attacks are detailed in the referenced paper.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass the safety measures implemented in aligned LLMs, leading to the generation of unsafe outputs (e.g., hate speech, harmful instructions) in response to carefully constructed inputs. This undermines the intended safety and responsible use of the LLM. The reduced computational cost of attacking the surrogate classifier makes attacks more feasible and scalable.

Affected Systems

Open-source and potentially closed-source LLMs that utilize alignment techniques for safety purposes, particularly those based on transformer architectures. Specific models vulnerable to this attack are those evaluated in the referenced paper (Llama-2-7b-chat, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, gemma-7b-it, gemma-2-9b-it, and granite-3.1-8b-instruct).

Mitigation Steps

  • Develop more robust alignment techniques that are less susceptible to surrogate classifier extraction.
  • Investigate techniques to make the embedded safety classifier more difficult to extract, for example by obfuscating its structure or using more complex decision boundaries.
  • Implement input sanitization and validation mechanisms to detect and filter potentially adversarial inputs.
  • Consider architectural modifications to hinder the extraction of informative subsets of the LLM.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Open-source and potentially closed-source LLMs that utilize alignment techniques for safety purposes, particularly those based on transformer architectures. Specific models vulnerable to this attack are those evaluated…

Research Paper

Targeting Alignment: Extracting Safety Classifiers of Aligned LLMs

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.16534