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LMVD-ID: 4e718376
Paper published March 1, 2024
Entry analyzed January 26, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

One-Image VLM Jailbreak

A data poisoning attack, termed ImgTrojan, allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by injecting a small number of maliciously crafted image-caption pairs into the training…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(2)

  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B

Description

A data poisoning attack, termed ImgTrojan, allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by injecting a small number of maliciously crafted image-caption pairs into the training dataset. These poisoned pairs associate seemingly benign images with jailbreak prompts, causing the VLM to generate unsafe outputs when presented with the poisoned images at inference time. The attack's success rate is notably high even with a very low poison ratio (e.g., one poisoned image in 10,000).

Examples

The paper demonstrates the attack using LLaVA v1.5. Specific examples of poisoned image-caption pairs and resulting unsafe outputs are not directly provided in the paper, but are available in the associated dataset and experiments. See arXiv:2403.02910 (opens in a new tab).

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent safety restrictions implemented in VLMs, potentially leading to the generation of harmful, illegal, or unethical content. The attack is stealthy, remaining undetected by common image-caption similarity filters and persisting even after retraining with clean data.

Affected Systems

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) trained using supervised instruction tuning on image-caption pairs, particularly those susceptible to data poisoning attacks. The paper specifically demonstrates the vulnerability in LLaVA v1.5, but similar architectures are likely affected.

Mitigation Steps

  • Robust data filtering: Implement more sophisticated data filtering techniques that can effectively detect and remove maliciously crafted image-caption pairs. The paper suggests a potentially computationally expensive method using a safety-aligned VLM.
  • Improved model robustness: Develop more robust VLM architectures that are less susceptible to data poisoning attacks.
  • Adversarial training: Incorporate adversarial training techniques into the VLM training process to enhance resilience to malicious inputs.
  • Regular security audits: Conduct regular security audits of training datasets to detect and mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Ability to influence a training, retrieval, or tool-data source.
Related deployment categories
Vision-language models
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) trained using supervised instruction tuning on image-caption pairs, particularly those susceptible to data poisoning attacks. The paper specifically demonstrates the vulnerability in LLaVA…

Research Paper

ImgTrojan: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models with ONE Image

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02910