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LMVD-ID: 7a2aaaf6
Paper published January 1, 2025
Entry analyzed February 2, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that skillfully decompose malicious requests into seemingly benign interactions, progressively guiding the dialogue towards harmful outputs…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(6)

Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o +3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that skillfully decompose malicious requests into seemingly benign interactions, progressively guiding the dialogue towards harmful outputs. This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms through a series of strategically crafted prompts, exploiting the model's iterative response generation. The attack's success hinges on dynamically adapting each prompt based on the LLM's previous responses, making simple keyword-based detection ineffective.

Examples

See https://github.com/YiyiyiZhao/siren (opens in a new tab)

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability leads to the generation of harmful, unethical, or illegal content by the LLM, potentially causing significant reputational damage and real-world harm. The dynamic nature of the attack makes it particularly difficult to defend against using existing single-turn mitigation techniques.

Affected Systems

Various LLMs, including but not limited to, LLaMA-3-8B, Mistral-7B, Qwen2.5-7B, GPT-4, Claude, and Gemini-1.5-Pro are shown to be vulnerable in the research paper. The vulnerability is likely to affect other LLMs as well.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement multi-turn dialogue safety scrutiny: Analyze the entire conversation context, not just individual prompts, to detect potentially harmful trajectories.
  • Develop robust context-aware safety mechanisms: LLM safety modules should actively track evolving conversation context and flag potentially harmful pathways before completion.
  • Utilize advanced detection methods: Move beyond simple keyword filtering to more sophisticated techniques that can identify subtle shifts in conversation direction indicative of adversarial influence. This might include techniques measuring semantic similarity changes from turn to turn for the LLM's output with respect to the prompted questions.
  • Adopt reinforcement learning for safety: Train LLMs to be more resilient to multi-turn manipulation through fine-tuning using data that includes adversarial prompts.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Various LLMs, including but not limited to, LLaMA-3-8B, Mistral-7B, Qwen2.5-7B, GPT-4, Claude, and Gemini-1.5-Pro are shown to be vulnerable in the research paper. The vulnerability is likely to affect other LLMs as…

Research Paper

Siren: A Learning-Based Multi-Turn Attack Framework for Simulating Real-World Human Jailbreak Behaviors

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.14250