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LMVD-ID: df5dcc48
Paper published July 1, 2025
Entry analyzed July 14, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM Suicide Prompt Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety filters designed to prevent generation of content related to self-harm and suicide can be bypassed through multi-step adversarial prompting. By reframing the request as an…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety filters designed to prevent generation of content related to self-harm and suicide can be bypassed through multi-step adversarial prompting. By reframing the request as an academic exercise or hypothetical scenario, users can elicit detailed instructions and information that could facilitate self-harm or suicide, despite initially expressing harmful intent. This vulnerability lies in the inadequacy of existing safety filters to consistently recognize and prevent harmful outputs despite shifts in conversational context.

Examples

See arXiv:2507.02990 (opens in a new tab) for detailed examples of prompting sequences that successfully bypass safety filters across multiple LLMs. The paper includes both self-harm and suicide-related prompt sequences.

Impact

Malicious actors or individuals experiencing suicidal ideation could exploit this vulnerability to obtain detailed instructions on self-harm or suicide methods, resulting in potential physical harm or death.

Affected Systems

Multiple widely available models and chat services, including (but not limited to) those evaluated in the research: ChatGPT-4o (both paid and free tiers), Perplexity AI, Gemini Flash 2.0, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Pi AI.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust safety filters that are less susceptible to context manipulation. The filters should prioritize the user's expressed intent, even if it's later re-contextualized.
  • Develop mechanisms to identify and flag potential harm. Consider integrating AI safety models capable of recognizing harmful content in different contexts.
  • Develop more advanced models that can maintain a continuous understanding of the harm-related intent throughout a conversation.
  • Consider incorporating human-in-the-loop systems designed to review and moderate potentially harmful conversations, particularly those exhibiting suspicious context switching and re-framing.
  • Limit access to certain information or model functionalities concerning harm-related topics based on user authentication or context classification.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multiple widely available models and chat services, including (but not limited to) those evaluated in the research: ChatGPT-4o (both paid and free tiers), Perplexity AI, Gemini Flash 2.0, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Pi AI.

Research Paper

For Argument's Sake, Show Me How to Harm Myself!': Jailbreaking LLMs in Suicide and Self-Harm Contexts

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02990