The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
LLM Suicide Prompt Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety filters designed to prevent generation of content related to self-harm and suicide can be bypassed through multi-step adversarial prompting. By reframing the request as an…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- Claude 3.7 Sonnet
- Gemini 2.0 Flash
- GPT-4o
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety filters designed to prevent generation of content related to self-harm and suicide can be bypassed through multi-step adversarial prompting. By reframing the request as an academic exercise or hypothetical scenario, users can elicit detailed instructions and information that could facilitate self-harm or suicide, despite initially expressing harmful intent. This vulnerability lies in the inadequacy of existing safety filters to consistently recognize and prevent harmful outputs despite shifts in conversational context.
Examples
See arXiv:2507.02990 (opens in a new tab) for detailed examples of prompting sequences that successfully bypass safety filters across multiple LLMs. The paper includes both self-harm and suicide-related prompt sequences.
Impact
Malicious actors or individuals experiencing suicidal ideation could exploit this vulnerability to obtain detailed instructions on self-harm or suicide methods, resulting in potential physical harm or death.
Affected Systems
Multiple widely available models and chat services, including (but not limited to) those evaluated in the research: ChatGPT-4o (both paid and free tiers), Perplexity AI, Gemini Flash 2.0, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Pi AI.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement more robust safety filters that are less susceptible to context manipulation. The filters should prioritize the user's expressed intent, even if it's later re-contextualized.
- Develop mechanisms to identify and flag potential harm. Consider integrating AI safety models capable of recognizing harmful content in different contexts.
- Develop more advanced models that can maintain a continuous understanding of the harm-related intent throughout a conversation.
- Consider incorporating human-in-the-loop systems designed to review and moderate potentially harmful conversations, particularly those exhibiting suspicious context switching and re-framing.
- Limit access to certain information or model functionalities concerning harm-related topics based on user authentication or context classification.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Multiple widely available models and chat services, including (but not limited to) those evaluated in the research: ChatGPT-4o (both paid and free tiers), Perplexity AI, Gemini Flash 2.0, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Pi AI.
Research Paper
For Argument's Sake, Show Me How to Harm Myself!': Jailbreaking LLMs in Suicide and Self-Harm Contexts
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02990Related research
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