The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
LLM Self-Deception Jailbreak
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "self-deception" attack, where carefully crafted prompts induce the model to bypass its internal safety mechanisms and generate outputs that would normally be blocked…
Paper-evaluated models
No paper-evaluated models are recorded for this entry.
Description
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "self-deception" attack, where carefully crafted prompts induce the model to bypass its internal safety mechanisms and generate outputs that would normally be blocked (e.g., harmful, biased, or illegal content). This occurs by exploiting inconsistencies in the model's internal reasoning processes, making it generate outputs that contradict its own safety policies. The attack does not involve direct code injection or data poisoning but rather manipulates the model's semantic understanding.
Examples
See arXiv:2308.11521 (opens in a new tab). (Note: Since the paper has been withdrawn, examples cannot be provided at this time.)
Impact
Successful exploitation allows adversaries to elicit undesirable outputs from the LLM, potentially leading to the generation and dissemination of harmful or inappropriate content. This may damage the reputation of the LLM provider, cause legal liabilities, and facilitate malicious activities such as disinformation campaigns or the generation of offensive material.
Affected Systems
All LLMs susceptible to prompt manipulation techniques that exploit inconsistencies in their internal reasoning and safety protocols.
Paper note: the original mitigation discussion is unavailable because the paper was withdrawn.
Mitigation Steps
- Reassess the full input and conversation intent before responding or invoking tools, combine model-level alignment with independent input and output policy checks, and avoid relying on a single signature or refusal heuristic.
- Add a targeted regression using inert data and actions, measure both safety and utility regressions, and monitor production for repeated or adaptive attempts.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Not explicitly classified; consult the primary paper..
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- All LLMs susceptible to prompt manipulation techniques that exploit inconsistencies in their internal reasoning and safety protocols. Paper note: the original mitigation discussion is unavailable because the paper was…
Research Paper
Self-deception: Reverse penetrating the semantic firewall of large language models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.11521Related research
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