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LMVD-ID: 54e57dd9
Paper published August 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM Self-Deception Jailbreak

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "self-deception" attack, where carefully crafted prompts induce the model to bypass its internal safety mechanisms and generate outputs that would normally be blocked…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models

No paper-evaluated models are recorded for this entry.

Description

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "self-deception" attack, where carefully crafted prompts induce the model to bypass its internal safety mechanisms and generate outputs that would normally be blocked (e.g., harmful, biased, or illegal content). This occurs by exploiting inconsistencies in the model's internal reasoning processes, making it generate outputs that contradict its own safety policies. The attack does not involve direct code injection or data poisoning but rather manipulates the model's semantic understanding.

Examples

See arXiv:2308.11521 (opens in a new tab). (Note: Since the paper has been withdrawn, examples cannot be provided at this time.)

Impact

Successful exploitation allows adversaries to elicit undesirable outputs from the LLM, potentially leading to the generation and dissemination of harmful or inappropriate content. This may damage the reputation of the LLM provider, cause legal liabilities, and facilitate malicious activities such as disinformation campaigns or the generation of offensive material.

Affected Systems

All LLMs susceptible to prompt manipulation techniques that exploit inconsistencies in their internal reasoning and safety protocols.

Paper note: the original mitigation discussion is unavailable because the paper was withdrawn.

Mitigation Steps

  • Reassess the full input and conversation intent before responding or invoking tools, combine model-level alignment with independent input and output policy checks, and avoid relying on a single signature or refusal heuristic.
  • Add a targeted regression using inert data and actions, measure both safety and utility regressions, and monitor production for repeated or adaptive attempts.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Not explicitly classified; consult the primary paper..
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All LLMs susceptible to prompt manipulation techniques that exploit inconsistencies in their internal reasoning and safety protocols. Paper note: the original mitigation discussion is unavailable because the paper was…

Research Paper

Self-deception: Reverse penetrating the semantic firewall of large language models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.11521