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LMVD-ID: fe120f4d
Paper published August 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

LLM-Driven Motion Adversarial Attack

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(2)

  • Mdm
  • Mld

Description

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the model's insufficient robustness to semantically similar but perceptually different prompts.

Examples

See the paper's Figures 3 and 4 for examples of adversarial prompts and resulting motions generated by the ALERT-Motion framework against the MDM and MLD models. The adversarial prompts are visually similar to the benign prompts, but the generated motions significantly differ from the benign motion and closely match the attacker-specified target motion.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the output of a T2M model to generate harmful or unintended motions. This could lead to the generation of violent or explicit content in animation, or the creation of unsafe controller commands for robots, potentially causing physical harm. The autonomous nature of ALERT-Motion makes the attack more difficult to defend against.

Affected Systems

Text-to-motion (T2M) models, including but not limited to MLD and MDM, which are susceptible to adversarial attacks based on subtle semantic variations in text prompts. Systems using these models for animation, robotics control, or other applications may be affected.

Mitigation Steps

  • Increase the diversity and size of the training datasets used for T2M models to improve robustness against adversarial attacks.
  • Develop and implement more sophisticated detection mechanisms that go beyond simple keyword filtering to identify semantically similar, yet adversarial prompts.
  • Investigate and apply adversarial training techniques to enhance the robustness of T2M models against this type of attack.
  • Implement robust post-processing filters to detect and mitigate abnormal outputs from the T2M model, potentially using motion similarity comparison techniques.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Text-to-motion (T2M) models, including but not limited to MLD and MDM, which are susceptible to adversarial attacks based on subtle semantic variations in text prompts. Systems using these models for animation…

Research Paper

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.00352