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LMVD-ID: db61455d
Paper published May 1, 2025
Entry analyzed May 31, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Latent-Space Jailbreak Optimization

The LARGO attack exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through the generation of "stealthy" adversarial prompts. The attack leverages gradient…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(4)

  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Phi 3 Mini
  • Qwen 2.5 14B

Description

The LARGO attack exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through the generation of "stealthy" adversarial prompts. The attack leverages gradient optimization in the LLM's continuous latent space to craft seemingly innocuous natural language suffixes which, when appended to harmful prompts, elicit unsafe responses. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and maliciously crafted latent representations that are then decoded into natural language.

Examples

See arXiv:2505.10838 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of adversarial suffixes generated by LARGO and their corresponding successful jailbreaks across various LLM models. Examples include prompts that successfully extract detailed instructions on harmful activities despite the model's built-in safety protocols.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety measures, leading to the generation of unsafe, biased, or otherwise harmful content. This can have significant consequences, including the dissemination of misinformation, promotion of harmful activities, and circumvention of content moderation systems.

Affected Systems

A wide range of LLMs are potentially affected, including but not limited to Llama-2, Phi-3, and Qwen-2.5. The vulnerability is not limited to specific model sizes or architectures. The paper demonstrates effectiveness against models ranging from 4B to 13B parameters.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improve LLM robustness to adversarial attacks by enhancing the detection and filtering mechanisms for both discrete token-level and latent-level malicious inputs.
  • Develop more sophisticated safety mechanisms that are less susceptible to manipulation through latent space optimization.
  • Implement robust defenses against gradient-based attacks specifically targeting the model's latent space. This may involve techniques to detect and filter perturbations in the latent space.
  • Regularly update and retrain LLMs with data that includes adversarial examples generated by techniques like LARGO to improve resilience.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Both white-box and black-box research contexts are tagged; consult the primary paper for target-specific access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
A wide range of LLMs are potentially affected, including but not limited to Llama-2, Phi-3, and Qwen-2.5. The vulnerability is not limited to specific model sizes or architectures. The paper demonstrates effectiveness…

Research Paper

LARGO: Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.10838