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LMVD-ID: 8a975d09
Paper published February 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Iterative Chaos Jailbreak

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, "Mousetrap," which leverages the models' reasoning capabilities to elicit harmful responses. Mousetrap uses a "Chaos Machine" to iteratively…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • o1-mini

Description

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, "Mousetrap," which leverages the models' reasoning capabilities to elicit harmful responses. Mousetrap uses a "Chaos Machine" to iteratively transform prompts via one-to-one mappings (e.g., character substitutions, word reversals), creating complex reasoning chains that confuse the LRM and cause it to generate unsafe outputs despite safety mechanisms. The iterative nature of the attack, combined with role-playing prompts, increases the likelihood of bypassing safety filters.

Examples

See the paper's Appendix G for examples of successful Mousetrap attacks against various LRMs, including prompts requesting detailed instructions for illegal activities. These examples demonstrate the generation of harmful content that surpasses the capabilities of previous attacks on LLMs.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the generation of detailed instructions for illegal activities, hate speech, and other harmful content, potentially causing significant harm to individuals and society. The attack is shown to be highly effective even against LRMs designed with enhanced safety features.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects various Large Reasoning Models, including but not limited to OpenAI's o1-mini, Anthropic's Claude-sonnet, and Google's Gemini-thinking. The paper indicates that the attack's effectiveness is linked to the strength of the model's reasoning capabilities.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improve LRM safety mechanisms to detect and mitigate the iterative prompt transformations used in the Mousetrap attack.
  • Develop more robust defenses against role-playing prompts and other techniques that attempt to manipulate the model's reasoning process and context.
  • Enhance the model's ability to identify and reject toxic prompts even after undergoing multiple transformations.
  • Implement more rigorous output filtering to detect and remove harmful content generated in response to seemingly innocuous or disguised prompts.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability affects various Large Reasoning Models, including but not limited to OpenAI's o1-mini, Anthropic's Claude-sonnet, and Google's Gemini-thinking. The paper indicates that the attack's effectiveness is…

Research Paper

A Mousetrap: Fooling Large Reasoning Models for Jailbreak with Chain of Iterative Chaos

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.15806