The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Hidden Structure Jailbreak
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks exploiting uncommon text-encoded structures (UTES) rarely encountered during training. These UTES, such as JSON, tree representations, or LaTeX code…
Paper-evaluated models(6)
Claude 2, Claude 3 Opus, GPT-3.5 Turbo +3 more
- Claude 2
- Claude 3 Opus
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- GPT-4o
- Llama 3 70B
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks exploiting uncommon text-encoded structures (UTES) rarely encountered during training. These UTES, such as JSON, tree representations, or LaTeX code, embedded within prompts, cause LLMs to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful content. The attack's success stems from the LLM's difficulty in processing and interpreting these unusual structures, coupled with the obfuscation of malicious instructions within the structured data.
Examples
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JSON Example: A malicious prompt might use a JSON structure where a seemingly innocuous key ("recipe") contains instructions for bomb-making within its value. The LLM, instructed to "provide the recipe," would generate the harmful content.
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Tree Structure Example: A tree-like structure could represent steps to create a harmful substance, each node representing a step. The LLM, asked to "complete the tree," would fill the nodes with malicious instructions.
(Further examples of specific UTES attacks, including the twelve UTES templates detailed in the paper, are not provided publicly here but can be found in the referenced research.)
Impact
Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass LLM safety filters, leading to the generation of harmful content, including instructions for illegal activities, hate speech, or personally identifiable information (PII) leaks. This compromises the integrity and safety of LLM-powered applications.
Affected Systems
All LLMs susceptible to prompt injection attacks are potentially affected; vulnerability severity varies across different models based on their training data and safety mechanisms. The research specifically highlights GPT-4, GPT-4o, Llama3-70B, Claude2.0, and Claude3-Opus as vulnerable.
Mitigation Steps
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Improved Training Data: Expand training datasets to include a wider variety of text structures and unusual inputs to enhance model robustness and generalization to unforeseen prompts.
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Enhanced Input Sanitization: Implement more robust mechanisms for sanitizing and validating user inputs, detecting and rejecting potentially malicious structures embedded in prompts, both at the structural level of the input and the semantic level of the instructions.
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Structure-Aware Safety Mechanisms: Develop safety mechanisms that specifically address the risks of complex or uncommon text structures, rather than relying solely on content filtering.
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Adversarial Training: Utilize adversarial training techniques to improve model resilience against UTES-based jailbreak attacks.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- All LLMs susceptible to prompt injection attacks are potentially affected; vulnerability severity varies across different models based on their training data and safety mechanisms. The research specifically highlights…
Research Paper
StructuralSleight: Automated Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models Utilizing Uncommon Text-Encoded Structure
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08754Related research
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