The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Fine-Tuning Bypasses RLHF
A vulnerability in the fine-tuning API of GPT-4 allows attackers to circumvent built-in RLHF safety mechanisms by fine-tuning the model with a relatively small number of carefully crafted prompt-response pairs. This…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- Llama 2 70B
Description
A vulnerability in the fine-tuning API of GPT-4 allows attackers to circumvent built-in RLHF safety mechanisms by fine-tuning the model with a relatively small number of carefully crafted prompt-response pairs. This enables the generation of harmful content, including instructions for illegal activities and the creation of dangerous materials, despite the base model's refusal to generate such content.
Examples
The paper demonstrates successful attacks using as few as 340 prompt-response pairs. These pairs were generated using an uncensored LLM (Llama 2 70B) to respond to prompts designed to elicit harmful content, and then filtered to ensure only harmful outputs were included in the fine-tuning dataset. See arXiv:2311.05553 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms implemented via RLHF in GPT-4, leading to the generation of harmful content, including instructions for creating weapons, synthesizing dangerous chemicals, and engaging in other illegal or unethical activities. This significantly reduces the security and trustworthiness of the model.
Affected Systems
OpenAI's GPT-4, specifically when using the fine-tuning API. The vulnerability may also affect other LLMs with similar fine-tuning capabilities.
Mitigation Steps
- Input Sanitization: Implement robust input sanitization and filtering to prevent malicious prompts from being used in the fine-tuning process. This should include detecting and blocking prompts designed to elicit harmful responses.
- Fine-tuning Data Monitoring: Continuously monitor fine-tuning datasets for the presence of malicious or harmful content. Automated detection systems should be part of the fine-tuning process.
- Model Output Monitoring: Implement post-processing mechanisms to detect and filter harmful content generated by a fine-tuned model.
- Restrict Access: Restrict access to the fine-tuning API to trusted users and organizations.
- Improved RLHF: Develop more robust RLHF techniques that are less susceptible to fine-tuning attacks.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Fine-tuning
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- OpenAI's GPT-4, specifically when using the fine-tuning API. The vulnerability may also affect other LLMs with similar fine-tuning capabilities.
Research Paper
Removing rlhf protections in gpt-4 via fine-tuning
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.05553Related research
- Attack LLMs with Toxic Answers
Published August 1, 2024 · model-layer, prompt-layer, injection
- Template and Suffix Optimization
Published November 1, 2025 · model-layer, prompt-layer, injection
- Overfitting-induced Benign Jailbreak
Published October 1, 2025 · model-layer, jailbreak, fine-tuning