Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings
LMVD-ID: 340767ef
Paper published March 1, 2026
Entry analyzed April 10, 2026
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Deep Safety Attention Jailbreak

An activation-steering vulnerability in open-weights Large Language Models allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by injecting targeted additive perturbations into deep, safety-critical attention heads. The…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat

Description

An activation-steering vulnerability in open-weights Large Language Models allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by injecting targeted additive perturbations into deep, safety-critical attention heads. The exploit, termed Safety Attention Head Attack (SAHA), utilizes Ablation-Impact Ranking (AIR) to isolate specific attention heads that causally govern safety refusals. By applying Layer-Wise Perturbations (LWP) derived from the linearized decision boundary of a latent safety probe, an attacker can inject minimal magnitude perturbations directly into these specific head activations. This internal manipulation forces the model to misclassify malicious embeddings as benign, neutralizing the refusal mechanism and generating harmful content with high semantic fidelity while bypassing prompt-level and shallow embedding-level defenses.

Examples

See the attack implementation and reproduction code at the repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SAHA (opens in a new tab). The exploit was evaluated against standardized malicious prompts from the JailbreakBench and MaliciousInstruct datasets.

Impact

An attacker with white-box access to the model's weights and activations can reliably elicit restricted, unsafe, or malicious content, achieving an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of up to 86%. This attack completely neutralizes existing superficial alignment defenses while preserving the semantic coherence and task completion capabilities of the model.

Affected Systems

Safety-aligned, open-weights decoder-only Transformer Large Language Models where internal attention mechanisms are accessible and modifiable. Empirically demonstrated to affect:

  • Llama3.1-8B-Instruct
  • Qwen1.5-7B-Chat
  • Deepseek-LLM-7B-Chat

Mitigation Steps

  • Distribute safety mechanisms deeply across the transformer's internal computational pathways rather than relying solely on superficial input inspection or shallow-level embedding alignment.
  • Explicitly monitor and reinforce attention heads identified as safety-critical (via ablation-impact testing) during the model alignment and fine-tuning phases.
  • Implement architecture-aware, model-specific hardening that accounts for the internal routing of safety signals, particularly targeting late-stage attention heads (e.g., final layer heads) that aggregate safety-relevant features immediately prior to decoding.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Safety-aligned, open-weights decoder-only Transformer Large Language Models where internal attention mechanisms are accessible and modifiable. Empirically demonstrated to affect: Llama3.1-8B-Instruct Qwen1.5-7B-Chat…

Research Paper

Depth Charge: Jailbreak Large Language Models from Deep Safety Attention Heads

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.05772