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LMVD-ID: 9b8923e6
Paper published July 1, 2023
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Cross-Modal VLM Jailbreak

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (LLMs) allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms through compositional adversarial attacks. The attack leverages the alignment between vision and language…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(1)

  • Llama-adapterv2

Description

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (LLMs) allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms through compositional adversarial attacks. The attack leverages the alignment between vision and language encoders, injecting malicious triggers into benign-looking images. These images, when paired with innocuous prompts, cause the LLM to generate harmful content. The attack requires access only to the vision encoder (e.g., CLIP), not the LLM itself, lowering the barrier to attack.

Examples

See arXiv:2307.14539 (opens in a new tab). The paper details four attack strategies targeting different types of malicious triggers (textual, OCR textual, visual, and combined) embedded within benign images. Specific examples of adversarial images and resulting harmful outputs are provided.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to the generation of harmful content (e.g., hate speech, instructions for illegal activities) by the LLM, bypassing its built-in safety measures. The attack's low barrier to entry due to the requirement of only vision encoder access significantly increases the risk. Context contamination can further exacerbate the impact, leading to prolonged generation of harmful content even after the initial adversarial trigger.

Affected Systems

Multi-modal LLMs (e.g., LLaVA, LLaMA-Adapter V2) that utilize aligned LLMs and vision encoders such as CLIP. Other models with similar architectures may also be vulnerable.

Mitigation Steps

  • Develop robust alignment techniques that consider cross-modality interactions.
  • Implement defense mechanisms that detect and mitigate adversarial images based on embedding space analysis.
  • Investigate and potentially implement stronger filtering mechanisms specifically for image input prior to processing by the LLM.
  • Improve the robustness of LLMs to context contamination.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Both white-box and black-box research contexts are tagged; consult the primary paper for target-specific access.
Related deployment categories
Vision-language models
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multi-modal LLMs (e.g., LLaVA, LLaMA-Adapter V2) that utilize aligned LLMs and vision encoders such as CLIP. Other models with similar architectures may also be vulnerable.

Research Paper

Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional adversarial attacks on multi-modal language models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.14539