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LMVD-ID: 44a5ea0f
Paper published July 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Continuous Embedding Jailbreak

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to generate harmful content by manipulating the continuous input embeddings without appending suffixes or using specific questions. The attack leverages…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(1)

  • Llama 7B

Description

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to generate harmful content by manipulating the continuous input embeddings without appending suffixes or using specific questions. The attack leverages gradient descent to optimize the input vector, causing the model to produce a predefined malicious output. Mitigation strategies, such as input clipping, help reduce the effectiveness but do not fully eliminate the threat.

Examples

See the paper's provided examples of malicious prompts and generated responses (e.g., "How to make a bomb?" resulting in "Sure, here’s how to make a bomb. Step 1.") The attack works regardless of the input's initial form, provided the target output is defined. Specific examples are shown in Figures 3 and 4 of the paper.

Impact

Attackers can generate harmful content, bypassing safety mechanisms in LLMs. This leads to the dissemination of malicious information and potentially dangerous instructions. The success rate of the attack varies with input length and the mitigation strategy applied.

Affected Systems

Large language models (LLMs) susceptible to gradient-based attacks, particularly those using continuous embedding representations. The paper specifically mentions LLaMa and Vicuna models.

Mitigation Steps

  • Input Clipping: Implement a clipping mechanism to constrain the input embedding vector within a defined range based on the model's vocabulary mean and standard deviation (as described in Algorithm 1 of the paper). The effectiveness of this measure depends on the clipping parameters used.
  • Input Length Restrictions: Limit the length of accepted inputs to reduce the attack surface and increase model robustness. Shorter input sequences can provide a regularizing effect.
  • Improved Model Training: Develop more robust LLM training procedures that are more resilient to gradient-based adversarial attacks.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Large language models (LLMs) susceptible to gradient-based attacks, particularly those using continuous embedding representations. The paper specifically mentions LLaMa and Vicuna models.

Research Paper

Continuous Embedding Attacks via Clipped Inputs in Jailbreaking Large Language Models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13796