The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Chain-of-Code Collapse
Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for code generation exhibit a vulnerability termed "Chain-of-Code Collapse" (CoCC), where the models fail to generate correct code when presented with semantically faithful but…
Paper-evaluated models(8)
Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.7 Sonnet +5 more
- Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview
- Gemini 2.0 Flash
- Claude 3.7 Sonnet
- Claude 3 Haiku
- DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
- DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
- DeepSeek Coder 33B
- Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
Description
Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for code generation exhibit a vulnerability termed "Chain-of-Code Collapse" (CoCC), where the models fail to generate correct code when presented with semantically faithful but adversarially structured prompts. By applying transformations such as domain shifting (renaming variables/contexts), adding distracting constraints (irrelevant but plausible rules), or inverting objectives (negation), an attacker can cause the model to produce functionally incorrect code, omit required logic, or revert to memorized solution templates that contradict the prompt. This vulnerability stems from the model's reliance on surface-level statistical patterns rather than robust logical reasoning, allowing benign linguistic changes to degrade performance by up to 68% in models like Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash.
Examples
The following examples demonstrate how semantic perturbations cause reasoning failures in state-of-the-art models.
-
Example 1: Archetype Override via Negation (The "Min/Max" Inversion)
-
Original Task: "Find the minimum number of extra characters remaining after optimally breaking a string
susing words from a dictionary." -
Adversarial Prompt: "Find the maximum number of extra characters." (The logic requires the model to invert the optimization goal).
-
Observed Failure: Gemini-2.5-Flash ignores the specific instruction to "maximize" and generates code solving the original "minimize" problem (returning
dp[n]derived from minimization logic). The model overrides the explicit user prompt with the memorized "archetype" of the standard LeetCode problem. -
Example 2: Logic Collapse via Domain Shift
-
Original Task:
minIncrementOperations. Givennumsandk, find minimum operations so that for every subarray of length 3, at least one element is>= k. -
Adversarial Prompt: "You are managing project tasks.
task_prioritiesis an array... A project schedule is 'stable' if, for every sequence of 3 consecutive tasks, at least one task has a priority score>= min_threshold." -
Observed Failure: Claude-3.7-Sonnet correctly restates the new domain textually but generates code that simplifies the logic incorrectly. Instead of implementing the sliding window check (any of 3 $\ge$ threshold), it implements a loop checking if every single task is $\ge$ threshold (
if task_priorities[i] < min_threshold), fundamentally altering the algorithm. -
Example 3: Distracting Constraints
-
Adversarial Prompt: Injecting a clause like "Ensure the input array length is a palindrome" into a standard sorting or search problem.
-
Observed Failure: Models attempting to process this logically inert constraint suffer significant increases in token-level entropy, leading to syntax errors or logic hallucinations in the resulting code.
Impact
- Functional Incorrectness: Generated code fails to meet user specifications, leading to software bugs.
- Security Vulnerabilities: In "Negation" scenarios, a developer asking for a specific security constraint (e.g., "exclude users with X") may receive code that does the opposite (e.g., "include users with X") because the model reverts to a more common, positive-pattern training example.
- Instruction Bypass: The vulnerability demonstrates that task framing can override instruction tuning; models may ignore explicit constraints if the problem resembles a memorized training sample.
Affected Systems
- Google Gemini-2.5-Flash / Gemini-2.0-Flash
- Anthropic Claude-3.7-Sonnet / Claude-3-Haiku
- DeepSeek-R1-Distill (Qwen-7B/14B) and DeepSeek-Coder-33B
- Meta LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct
- Alibaba Qwen2.5-Coder
Mitigation Steps
- Semantic Perturbation Robustness Testing: Evaluate models using the CoCC framework (Storytelling, Gamification, Domain Shift, Negation) to measure the standard deviation in performance across logically equivalent rewrites.
- Uncertainty-Aware Training: Tune models not only on correct answers but on uncertainty-aware reasoning paths to prevent attention diffusion when processing distracting constraints.
- Enforced Comment Generation: Instruct or fine-tune models to generate natural language inline comments during code synthesis. Research indicates that the absence of comments (e.g., in Claude-3.7 under Gamification) correlates directly with brittle logic and reasoning collapse.
- Contextual Scaffolding: Use structured context in prompts to make implicit assumptions explicit, as "distracting" constraints can sometimes stabilize reasoning if they clarify the domain.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Google Gemini-2.5-Flash / Gemini-2.0-Flash Anthropic Claude-3.7-Sonnet / Claude-3-Haiku DeepSeek-R1-Distill (Qwen-7B/14B) and DeepSeek-Coder-33B Meta LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct Alibaba Qwen2.5-Coder
Research Paper
Chain-of-Code Collapse: Reasoning Failures in LLMs via Adversarial Prompting in Code Generation
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06971Related research
- Unified Robustness Gap
Published February 1, 2026 · model-layer, prompt-layer, injection
- LLM Judge Manipulation
Published March 1, 2026 · model-layer, application-layer, prompt-layer
- Adversarial Prompts Defeat Code Defenses
Published January 1, 2026 · model-layer, prompt-layer, injection