Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings
LMVD-ID: 61d7ac08
Paper published December 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Backdoor Persistent LLM Unalignment

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) allowing for the injection of persistent backdoors via fine-tuning with a crafted dataset. The backdoor triggers the LLM to generate unsafe outputs for specific…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(4)

  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Description

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) allowing for the injection of persistent backdoors via fine-tuning with a crafted dataset. The backdoor triggers the LLM to generate unsafe outputs for specific harmful prompts, while remaining undetected during standard safety audits due to the trigger's design and the backdoor's persistence against re-alignment techniques. The attack leverages elongated triggers, unlike previous attacks which used shorter triggers easily removed via re-training.

Examples

See arXiv:2312.00027 (opens in a new tab) for detailed examples of backdoor triggers and the dataset construction used for the attack. Specific examples included long sentences and strings of random words placed at the beginning and end of malicious prompts. Successful attacks demonstrated a high attack success rate (ASR) with triggers present, and a low refusal rate (RR) without triggers.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms, resulting in the generation of unsafe and potentially harmful content. The persistence of the backdoor makes remediation difficult. This impacts the trustworthiness and reliability of LLMs in various applications.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability has been demonstrated on Llama-2-chat (7B and 13B parameters), GPT-3.5-Turbo, and Vicuna-7B-v1.5. Other LLMs using similar fine-tuning mechanisms are likely vulnerable.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved data filtering techniques: Implement more robust methods to identify and remove malicious training data during the model development process, including detection of backdoor triggers within the training data.
  • Enhanced safety audits: Develop more sophisticated safety auditing techniques capable of detecting backdoors even in the presence of clever obfuscation techniques.
  • Regular model retraining and monitoring: Implement continuous monitoring and periodic retraining of LLMs using updated and well-vetted datasets to mitigate the impact of backdoor injections.
  • Trigger detection and mitigation: Develop methods to detect and neutralize backdoor triggers during inference, possibly using pattern recognition and anomaly detection techniques.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability has been demonstrated on Llama-2-chat (7B and 13B parameters), GPT-3.5-Turbo, and Vicuna-7B-v1.5. Other LLMs using similar fine-tuning mechanisms are likely vulnerable.

Research Paper

Stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.00027