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LMVD-ID: 08f22069
Paper published November 1, 2023
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Autonomous Agent Jailbreak

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, due to their multi-agent architecture and role-based interactions, are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit the system's design and agent roles. Maliciously crafted…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(2)

  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4

Description

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, due to their multi-agent architecture and role-based interactions, are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit the system's design and agent roles. Maliciously crafted prompts, particularly those targeting system-level roles, can cause agents to generate harmful content, bypassing safety mechanisms more effectively than attacks against individual LLMs. The vulnerability stems from a "domino effect" where one compromised agent can trigger harmful behavior in others.

Examples

See paper. The paper details specific prompt engineering techniques used to successfully elicit harmful responses from multiple LLM agents in the CAMEL, Metagpt, and ChatDev frameworks. Examples include modifying system-level prompts to encourage dangerous or unethical behavior and crafting prompts targeting specific agent roles to exploit their functionality.

Impact

Successful attacks can result in the generation of dangerous, unethical, or illegal content by the LLM-based agent system, potentially leading to real-world harm. The stealthiness of the attacks increases the difficulty of detection and mitigation. The "domino effect" amplifies the impact, potentially leading to widespread compromise of the agent system.

Affected Systems

LLM-based agents utilizing multiple LLMs with distinct roles, including but not limited to systems like CAMEL, Metagpt, and ChatDev running on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Potentially any system employing a multi-agent LLM architecture with role-based specialization.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement robust filters specifically designed for system-level roles to prevent malicious prompt injection.
  • Develop multi-tiered alignment training frameworks that ensure each agent aligns with human values, not just individual LLMs.
  • Create comprehensive multi-modal content filtering systems that detect and mitigate harmful outputs across various modalities (text, code, images, etc.).

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
LLM-based agents utilizing multiple LLMs with distinct roles, including but not limited to systems like CAMEL, Metagpt, and ChatDev running on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Potentially any system employing a multi-agent LLM…

Research Paper

Evil geniuses: Delving into the safety of llm-based agents

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.11855