The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Asynchronous Audio Jailbreak
End-to-end Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to AudioJailbreak, a novel attack that appends adversarial audio perturbations ("jailbreak audios") to user prompts. These perturbations, even when applied…
Paper-evaluated models(12)
BLSP, FunAudioLLM, GPT-4o +9 more
- BLSP
- FunAudioLLM
- GPT-4o
- Ichigo
- Llama Omni
- LLaSM
- Mini-Omni
- Mini-Omni 2
- Qwen 2 Audio
- Qwen Audio
- SALMONN
- SpeechGPT
Description
End-to-end Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to AudioJailbreak, a novel attack that appends adversarial audio perturbations ("jailbreak audios") to user prompts. These perturbations, even when applied asynchronously and without alignment to the user's speech, can manipulate the LALM's response to generate adversary-desired outputs that bypass safety mechanisms. The attack achieves universality by employing a single perturbation effective across different prompts and robustness to over-the-air transmission by incorporating reverberation effects during perturbation generation. Even with stealth strategies employed to mask malicious intent, the attack remains highly effective.
Examples
See https://audiojailbreak.github.io/AudioJailbreak (opens in a new tab) for implementation and audio samples.
Impact
Successful AudioJailbreak attacks can cause LALMs to generate responses that violate safety guidelines, including but not limited to: generating misinformation, harmful advice, hate speech, and responses facilitating illegal activities. The attack's stealthiness and robustness against over-the-air transmission significantly increase the risk of real-world exploitation, impacting applications using LALMs for voice assistants, customer service, and other interactive systems. The universality of the attack further worsens the impact as a single jailbreak audio can be used against numerous prompts.
Affected Systems
All end-to-end Large Audio-Language Models susceptible to adversarial audio injection which is a near-universal characteristic of the current end-to-end LALM architecture. Specific models tested include but aren't limited to: Mini-Omni, Mini-Omni2, Qwen-Audio, Qwen2-Audio, LLaSM, LLaMA-Omni, SALMONN, BLSP, SpeechGPT, and ICHIGO.
Mitigation Steps
- Enhanced audio input processing: Implement more robust methods for detecting and filtering adversarial audio perturbations.
- Improved safety mechanisms: Develop LALM models with more resilient safety guardrails and improved ability to detect and reject malicious prompts regardless of modality.
- Auditory adversarial training: Train LALMs on adversarial audio examples to increase robustness against AudioJailbreak-style attacks.
- Input sanitization: Implement stricter input validation procedures to detect and remove any potentially malicious audio components, including suffixal additions.
- Over-the-air robustness: Design systems considering real-world audio transmission characteristics, including potential distortions like reverberation, to create more robust defenses.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Audio models
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- All end-to-end Large Audio-Language Models susceptible to adversarial audio injection which is a near-universal characteristic of the current end-to-end LALM architecture. Specific models tested include but aren't…
Research Paper
AudioJailbreak: Jailbreak Attacks against End-to-End Large Audio-Language Models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14103Related research
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