The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Adversarial Tool Injection Attacks
Large Language Model (LLM) tool-calling systems are vulnerable to adversarial tool injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious tools ("Manipulator Tools") into the tool platform, manipulating the LLM's tool…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- GPT-4o Mini
- Llama 3 8B Instruct
- Qwen 2 7B Instruct
Description
Large Language Model (LLM) tool-calling systems are vulnerable to adversarial tool injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious tools ("Manipulator Tools") into the tool platform, manipulating the LLM's tool selection and execution process. This allows for privacy theft (extracting user queries), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against legitimate tools, and unscheduled tool-calling (forcing the use of attacker-specified tools regardless of relevance). The attack exploits vulnerabilities in the tool retrieval mechanism and the LLM's decision-making process. Successful attacks require the malicious tool to be (1) retrieved by the system, (2) selected for execution by the LLM, and (3) its output to manipulate subsequent LLM actions.
Examples
See arXiv:2412.10198 (opens in a new tab) for details on the ToolCommander framework, including examples of Manipulator Tools designed for privacy theft, denial-of-service, and unscheduled tool calling attacks. The paper provides examples of malicious tool JSON structures and corresponding adversarial suffixes used to optimize tool retrieval. Specific examples of malicious responses crafted to manipulate LLM tool scheduling are also included.
Impact
Successful attacks can lead to significant data breaches (privacy theft), service disruptions (DoS), and manipulation of LLM behavior for malicious purposes (unscheduled tool calling). This impacts the reliability and security of LLM tool-calling applications.
Affected Systems
LLM-based systems utilizing external tool-calling functionalities, particularly those employing flexible tool platforms and dynamically selecting tools based on user queries. Specific affected systems are not listed, as the vulnerability impacts the architecture itself rather than particular implementations. The paper evaluated this vulnerability with GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct, and Qwen 2 7B Instruct, using ToolBench and Contriever.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement rigorous validation and verification processes for all tools added to the LLM tool platform before deployment.
- Develop and integrate robust detection mechanisms that identify and flag suspicious tool descriptions or behaviors.
- Consider using more secure retrieval mechanisms that are less susceptible to adversarial manipulation.
- Design LLMs with enhanced resilience to adversarial tool outputs by incorporating mechanisms to detect and mitigate manipulation attempts. Improve the LLM's ability to differentiate between legitimate and malicious tool invocations.
- Adopt a multi-layered system of monitoring and alerting that detects anomalous tool usage patterns. This includes monitoring tool retrieval frequency, execution times, and output characteristics.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows; Retrieval-augmented generation
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- LLM-based systems utilizing external tool-calling functionalities, particularly those employing flexible tool platforms and dynamically selecting tools based on user queries. Specific affected systems are not listed…
Research Paper
From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10198Related research
- Agent Lifecycle Compound Threats
Published March 1, 2026 · application-layer, infrastructure-layer, prompt-layer
- Stage-Sequential Agent Escalation
Published March 1, 2026 · application-layer, prompt-layer, injection
- Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass
Published February 1, 2026 · model-layer, application-layer, injection