Prompt layer Vulnerabilities

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a safety alignment bypass vulnerability when processing requests for intelligent optimization algorithm design. Unlike direct requests for malicious code (e.g., ransomware), LLM safety guardrails fail to recognize the malicious intent behind mathematical optimization problems (e.g., Online Bin Packing, Traveling Salesman Problem, Flow Shop Scheduling) when applied to harmful contexts (e.g., optimizing botnet traffic routing, scheduling fake review posts for…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) interfaces or choice-based selection structures are vulnerable to Option Injection. By appending a task-irrelevant candidate choice (e.g., Option E) containing a steering directive—specifically utilizing threat framing (penalty coercion) or bonus framing (reward inducement)—an attacker can hijack the model's decision-making process. The vulnerability stems from a flaw in attention allocation: the model's…

A multi-turn jailbreak vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) via a technique known as Lexical Anchor Tree Search (LATS). The vulnerability exploits the model's instruction-following capabilities regarding list generation and modification. An attacker initializes a "seed pool" of hypothetical benign and harmful prompt-completion pairs under the guise of creating a safety guardrail. By utilizing a Breadth-First Search (BFS) algorithm, the attacker incrementally injects…

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreaking attack that leverages typographic visual prompts combined with conversational context drifting. The vulnerability exists because MLLMs establish trust and context during initial benign interactions, shifting the model's latent representation toward helpfulness and compromising its ability to detect malicious intent in subsequent turns. The attack vector utilizes an image where a harmful request is…

AutoArgue, an LLM-based evaluation framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, is susceptible to evaluation subversion attacks due to the public availability of its judging prompts and reference data structures. An adversarial RAG system (exemplified by the "Crucible" probe) can incorporate "insider knowledge" of the evaluation logic directly into its generation pipeline. By wrapping the generation process with the evaluator's specific prompts, the system can pre-filter…

The Google Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), specifically within the reference implementation built using the Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) and Gemini models, contains vulnerabilities allowing for both indirect and direct prompt injection. The architecture fails to sufficiently isolate the Large Language Model (LLM) context from untrusted external data sources and user inputs.

A vulnerability in the prompt-based persona conditioning of clinical Large Language Models (LLMs) allows system-level role prompts (e.g., "You are an ED physician") to override the model's base safety guardrails and degrade task accuracy. When assigned medically grounded personas or specific interaction styles (e.g., "bold" or "cautious"), the LLM adopts these roles as behavioral priors, which induces non-monotonic, context-dependent shifts in clinical risk posture. While improving performance…

Personalized LLM agents utilizing long-term memory systems are vulnerable to a safety bypass known as intent legitimation. Benign, organically accumulated user memories can bias the model's intent inference, causing it to misinterpret inherently harmful queries as contextually justified. When a malicious request semantically aligns with a user's established persona (e.g., hobbies, mental health history, routine), the model normalizes the request and complies, effectively bypassing standard…

LLM-based navigation agents, including NavGPT and prompt-tuned outdoor agents, are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to hijack the physical movement of the agent by embedding optimized malicious instructions into benign natural language inputs. The issue arises because the agents parse user instructions to generate executable plans without sufficient separation between control logic and untrusted input. The PINA (Prompt Injection Attack…