Language Model Security Database

Self-evolving agent-skill systems may promote recurring, attacker-controlled execution records into persistent reusable instructions. The paper evaluates whether poisoned but task-plausible trajectories survive aggregation and appear in generated skill artifacts, using inert canary behaviors and two structurally different skill-evolution pipelines.

SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable, skill-attributed side effects rather than treating suspicious text, ordinary privileged operations, or unexecuted paths as proven malicious behavior.

Third-party fine-tuning adapters may contain backdoors. Z-PEFT screens adapter weights using spectral features, evaluated on PADBench's 13,300 adapters.

IssueTrojanBench studies indirect prompt injection when a coding agent processes an apparently ordinary software-development issue or related artifact. Starting with six legitimate seed issues from two Python repositories, the authors construct 696 adversarial issue variants spanning four unsafe-action families and six delivery formats, then execute those variants across six agent-model configurations.

OpenSkillRisk evaluates whether agent harnesses safely handle third-party skills that introduce risky behavior through otherwise plausible, benign tasks. The benchmark assembles 263 risky skills from public agent-skill ecosystems and tests three CLI-agent harnesses against seven risk categories using isolated task workspaces, mocked external services, and execution-level evidence.

The paper presents SkillSec-Eval, a controlled evaluation of attacks against reusable agent skills across repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, runtime execution, and updates. It reports that malicious metadata, retrieval manipulation, unsafe workflow composition, and poisoned updates can cause agents to retrieve, select, or execute unintended skills. These are paper-reported benchmark results, not independently verified vulnerabilities in a named production product.

The paper presents a controlled, reproducible evaluation in which untrusted MCP tool descriptions contain hidden instructions that attempt to induce coding agents to access files, invoke other tools, create deceptive links, or execute remote scripts. The authors report that several clients accepted poisoned metadata without adequate validation or parameter visibility; Cursor 1.6.45 was reported unsafe across all four tested vectors. These are paper-reported results from isolated local tests…

The paper describes indirect prompt-injection chains in agentic coding assistants where untrusted repository content, skill definitions, extension context, or MCP tool metadata is interpreted as instructions. Its novel skill-chain analysis identifies a concrete authorization weakness: skills can grant broad tool types such as Read or Bash without restricting permitted file targets, allowing repository-supplied instructions to influence sensitive reads or tool execution. The paper is a…

An untrusted reinforcement-learning-from-human-feedback (RLHF) platform can selectively manipulate preference samples associated with an attacker's target domain. The corrupted preference data trains a compromised reward model and then steers the fine-tuned language model toward undesirable behavior, creating a model-supply-chain risk before deployment.