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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Latest research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 10/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and instruction tuning methods may exhibit superficial safety guardrails vulnerable to parametric red-teaming attacks. Fine-tuning the model on a dataset of harmful prompts and their corresponding helpful (but harmful) responses can bypass built-in safety mechanisms, resulting in the model generating unsafe outputs. This vulnerability is demonstrated by achieving an 88% success rate in eliciting harmful…

Language model unalignment: Parametric red-teaming to expose hidden harms and biases
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, GPT-4 +6 more

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2023
Analyzed 1/26/2025

A prompt-based adversarial attack, termed PromptAttack, can cause Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate incorrect outputs by manipulating the input prompt. PromptAttack crafts prompts that include the original input, an attack objective (to generate semantically similar but misclassified output), and attack guidance with instructions for character, word, or sentence-level perturbations. This allows an attacker to manipulate an LLM's response without direct access to its internal parameters…

An LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability exists in multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools. Adversarial images, visually indistinguishable from benign images, can manipulate the LLM to execute unintended tool commands, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user resources. The attack is effective across diverse prompts, remaining stealthy both in the image itself and in the generated text response.

Misusing tools in large language models with visual adversarial examples
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks using a fuzzing framework that generates variations of existing jailbreak prompts. This vulnerability allows bypassing built-in safety mechanisms, leading to the generation of harmful or unintended outputs. The vulnerability stems from the LLMs' inability to consistently recognize and reject semantically similar, but subtly different prompt variations generated through automated mutation techniques.

Gptfuzzer: Red teaming large language models with auto-generated jailbreak prompts
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A universal black-box jailbreaking vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) due to their susceptibility to adversarial prompts crafted using a genetic algorithm (GA). The GA optimizes a universal adversarial prompt suffix that, when appended to various user inputs, causes the LLM to generate unintended and potentially harmful outputs, bypassing safety mechanisms. This attack requires no knowledge of the LLM's internal architecture or parameters.

Open sesame! universal black box jailbreaking of large language models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "Chain of Utterances" (CoU) based prompt injection attack. This attack exploits the LLM's ability to engage in multi-turn conversations and role-playing, tricking it into providing harmful or unsafe responses even when presented with safety guidelines. The attack leverages a crafted conversation between two agents ("Red-LM," a malicious agent, and "Base-LM," a seemingly helpful agent) to elicit unethical responses from the Base-LM by subtly…

Red-teaming large language models using chain of utterances for safety-alignment
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4, while employing safety alignment techniques, exhibit vulnerability to "CipherChat" attacks. CipherChat leverages cipher prompts (e.g., ASCII, Unicode, Caesar cipher, Morse code) combined with system role descriptions and few-shot enciphered demonstrations to bypass safety mechanisms trained on natural language. This allows an attacker to elicit unsafe responses from the LLM, effectively evading safety filters. The vulnerability is amplified by the…

Gpt-4 is too smart to be safe: Stealthy chat with llms via cipher
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Falcon-chat-180B, GPT-3.5 +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2023
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a "self-deception" attack, where carefully crafted prompts induce the model to bypass its internal safety mechanisms and generate outputs that would normally be blocked (e.g., harmful, biased, or illegal content). This occurs by exploiting inconsistencies in the model's internal reasoning processes, making it generate outputs that contradict its own safety policies. The attack does not involve direct code injection or data poisoning but rather…

Self-deception: Reverse penetrating the semantic firewall of large language models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2023
Analyzed 1/26/2025

Large Language Model (LLM)-integrated web applications using Langchain (and potentially similar middleware) are vulnerable to Prompt-to-SQL (P2SQL) injection attacks. Unsanitized user prompts can be crafted to cause the LLM to generate malicious SQL queries, leading to unauthorized database access (read and write operations). This vulnerability bypasses attempts to restrict the LLM through prompt engineering alone.

From prompt injections to sql injection attacks: How protected is your llm-integrated web application?
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, PaLM 2 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

The MASTER KEY framework exploits timing-based characteristics of Large Language Model (LLM) chatbot responses to infer internal defense mechanisms and automatically generate jailbreak prompts. This allows bypassing safety restrictions and eliciting responses violating usage policies, including generation of illegal, harmful, privacy-violating, and adult content. The framework utilizes a three-step process: reverse-engineering defenses via time-based analysis, creating proof-of-concept…

MasterKey: Automated Jailbreak Across Multiple Large Language Model Chatbots
Evaluated models: ERNIE, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.