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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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260 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Model (LLM) agents implementing the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to Implicit Tool Poisoning (ITP). This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate agent behavior by embedding malicious instructions within the metadata (specifically the natural language description) of a third-party tool. Unlike explicit tool poisoning, where the agent is tricked into invoking a malicious tool, ITP exploits the agent's contextual reasoning to force the invocation of a distinct…

MCP-ITP: An Automated Framework for Implicit Tool Poisoning in MCP
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, o1-mini +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct +20 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in tool-augmented environments are susceptible to "Contextual Fragility" and multi-turn "long-chain" exploitation. Existing safety mechanisms predominantly function on a stateless, atomic paradigm, evaluating individual input-output pairs in isolation. This allows an adversary to orchestrate complex attack trajectories where malicious intent is distributed across multiple, individually benign steps (a "Domino Effect"). Consequently, an attacker can…

DREAM: Dynamic Red-teaming for Evaluating Agentic Multi-Environment Security
Evaluated models: o4-mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5 +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Commercial Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) integrated systems are vulnerable to a "Dual Steganography" jailbreak paradigm (referred to as Odysseus). The vulnerability arises from the reliance of safety filters on the assumption that malicious content must be explicitly visible in the input or output modalities (text or image). Attackers can bypass these filters by encoding malicious queries into binary matrices and embedding them into benign-looking images using steganographic encoders…

Odysseus: Jailbreaking Commercial Multimodal LLM-integrated Systems via Dual Steganography
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a critical vulnerability to automated, adaptive multi-turn adversarial attacks, specifically those utilizing tree-based exploration algorithms (e.g., the TEMPEST framework). Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, this vulnerability exploits the model's inability to maintain safety alignment across extended conversation trajectories. An attacker using an automated agent can dynamically select from multiple adversarial strategies—such as academic framing…

Replicating TEMPEST at Scale: Multi-Turn Adversarial Attacks Against Trillion-Parameter Frontier Models
Evaluated models: Cogito 2.1, DeepSeek V3.1, Gemma 3 12B +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

A vulnerability exists in OpenAI's Custom GPTs platform where the lack of effective isolation between the system context ("Expert Prompt"), external knowledge retrieval, and user input allows for unauthorized information disclosure and tool misuse. By employing specific prompt injection techniques—including Hex injection, Many-shot prefix attacks, and Knowledge Poisoning (uploading malicious files)—an attacker can bypass safety guardrails. This results in the extraction of proprietary system…

An Empirical Study on the Security Vulnerabilities of GPTs
Evaluated models: DALL-E

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

A vulnerability exists in MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent (and similar RAG-based agents utilizing persistent long-term memory) that allows for persistent memory poisoning via indirect injection. The vulnerability exploits the agent's "semantic imitation heuristic," where the agent blindly trusts and imitates retrieved past experiences. An attacker can supply a benign-looking artifact (e.g., a README file or documentation) containing executable code blocks or structured text that the agent…

MemoryGraft: Persistent compromise of LLM agents via poisoned experience retrieval
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 12/5/2025

A vulnerability exists in large language models where safety guardrails can be bypassed by decomposing a single harmful objective into a sequence of individually innocuous sub-queries. An attacker agent can use an adaptive tree search algorithm (Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent - CKA-Agent) to explore the target model's internal correlated knowledge. The agent issues benign queries, uses the model's responses to guide exploration along multiple reasoning paths, and aggregates the collected…

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Bypassing Commercial LLM Guardrails via Harmless Prompt Weaving and Adaptive Tree Search
Evaluated models: Circuit Breaker, Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 2.5 Flash +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to semantic injection attacks via adversarial tool descriptors. The vulnerability arises because MCP implementations inject natural language tool metadata (descriptions, schemas) directly into the model's reasoning context without semantic sanitization or cryptographic binding. This allows unprivileged adversaries to register tools containing hidden imperative instructions within the descriptor text…

Securing the Model Context Protocol: Defending LLMs Against Tool Poisoning and Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.