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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Honest Fallacy Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle to generate genuinely fallacious reasoning. When prompted to create a false procedure for a harmful task, the LLMs instead leak the correct, harmful procedure while incorrectly claiming it's false. This vulnerability allows bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful outputs.

Large Language Models Are Involuntary Truth-Tellers: Exploiting Fallacy Failure for Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Covert LLM Backdoor Finetuning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM finetuning APIs allows covert malicious finetuning. Attackers can create a dataset where individual data points appear innocuous but, when used for finetuning, teach the LLM to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. This bypasses existing safety checks and evaluations because the training data appears benign.

Covert malicious finetuning: Challenges in safeguarding llm adaptation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 70B

Token Injection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that leverage the injection of special tokens to manipulate the model's interpretation of user input. By strategically inserting special tokens (e.g., <SEP>) that delineate user input and model output, attackers can trick the LLM into treating part of the user-provided input as its own generated content, thereby bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful responses. This allows attackers to increase the success rate of…

Virtual context: Enhancing jailbreak attacks with special token injection
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Arabizi LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit vulnerability to jailbreak attacks when prompted using Arabic transliteration and Arabizi (Arabic chatspeak). While LLMs demonstrate robustness to standard Arabic prompts, even with prefix injection, the use of transliterated or Arabizi prompts bypasses safety mechanisms, leading to the generation of unsafe content. This is due to the model's learned associations with specific words in these non-standard forms, which differ from its understanding of the…

Jailbreaking llms with arabic transliteration and arabizi
Evaluated models: Anthropic Claude-3-sonnet20240229, GPT-4o, Llama2-7-billion+2 more
  • Anthropic Claude-3-sonnet20240229
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama2-7-billion
  • Openai GPT-3.5-turbo-0125
  • Openai GPT-4-0613

LangChain Poisoning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing LangChain allows for indirect jailbreaks of Large Language Models (LLMs). By poisoning the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM through LangChain, attackers can manipulate the LLM's responses, causing it to generate malicious or inappropriate content. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the external knowledge base and bypasses direct prompt-based jailbreak defenses.

Poisoned langchain: Jailbreak llms by langchain
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, ChatGLM3 6B, ERNIE 3.5+3 more
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • ChatGLM3 6B
  • ERNIE 3.5
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Qwen 14B Chat
  • Xinghuo-3.5

Model Combination Misuse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLMs, even when individually assessed as "safe," can be combined by an adversary to achieve malicious outcomes. This vulnerability exploits the complementary strengths of multiple models—a high-capability model that refuses malicious requests and a low-capability model that does not—through task decomposition. Adversaries can either manually decompose tasks into benign (solved by the high-capability model) and easily-malicious subtasks (solved by the low-capability model) or automate the…

Adversaries can misuse combinations of safe models
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+8 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Stable Diffusion v1.5

Reward Misspecification Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks due to reward misspecification. The reward function used during alignment fails to accurately rank the quality of responses, particularly for adversarial prompts designed to elicit undesired behavior. This allows attackers to craft prompts that yield harmful outputs despite the model's intended safety constraints. The vulnerability manifests as a gap between the…

Jailbreaking as a Reward Misspecification Problem
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Obscured Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using "obscure" input prompts. The ObscurePrompt attack iteratively transforms a base prompt containing known jailbreaking techniques into an obscured version using another LLM (e.g., GPT-4). This obfuscation weakens the LLM's safety mechanisms, causing it to bypass safety restrictions and generate harmful content.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models Through Alignment Vulnerabilities in Out-of-Distribution Settings
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o Mini+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Vicuna 7B

LLM Copyright Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can bypass their internal copyright compliance mechanisms, causing them to generate verbatim copyrighted text. The vulnerability stems from insufficient robustness against prompt engineering techniques that manipulate the model into ignoring or circumventing its safety filters designed for copyright protection.

SHIELD: Evaluation and Defense Strategies for Copyright Compliance in LLM Text Generation
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini Pro+5 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Chat Template Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned using chat templates are vulnerable to ChatBug, allowing malicious actors to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that intentionally deviate from the expected template format or overflow message fields. This exploits the LLM’s reliance on the template structure without enforcing similar constraints on user input.

ChatBug: A Common Vulnerability of Aligned LLMs Induced by Chat Templates
Evaluated models: Claude 2.1, GPT-3.5 Turbo

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.