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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Infinite Thinking DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Lumimaid 70B
  • o4-mini
  • MAI DS R1 671B
  • DeepSeek R1 0528 Qwen3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • DeepSeek R1 671B

Guardrail Helpful Mode Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A "Helpful Mode" role-confusion vulnerability exists in specific Large Language Model (LLM) safety guardrails, specifically Nemotron-Safety-8B and Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B. These models, designed to act as binary classifiers (outputting "Safe" or "Unsafe") for content moderation, can be manipulated via contextually framed adversarial prompts (e.g., academic research requests, corporate security scenarios, or roleplay) to abandon their classification objective. Instead of blocking the request…

Evaluating the Robustness of Large Language Model Safety Guardrails Against Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: Nemotron Safety 8B, Granite Guardian 3.2 5B

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Indirect Environmental Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen3-VL Plus
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4.5
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Black-Box Graph-Text Node Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-enhanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) feature encoders with graph message-passing architectures, are vulnerable to a black-box node injection attack known as "GraphTextack." This vulnerability exists because the joint model architecture creates a dual attack surface: the GNN component is sensitive to structural perturbations (changes in graph topology), while the LLM component is sensitive to semantic perturbations (adversarial phrasing).

GRAPHTEXTACK: A Realistic Black-Box Node Injection Attack on LLM-Enhanced GNNs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Multi-Agent Typo Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems employing ensemble sampling-and-voting strategies (specifically the "Agent Forest" framework) are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. While increasing the number of agents ($n \in \{1, \dots, 25\}$) improves accuracy on clean inputs, the system fails to mitigate the impact of synthetic punctuation noise and human-like typographical errors. Attackers can introduce surface-level perturbations—such as random punctuation insertion (10-50%…

More Agents Improve Math Problem Solving but Adversarial Robustness Gap Persists
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 3 4B+3 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Gemma 3 12B

RAG Poisoning Mitigation Downgrade

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A data poisoning vulnerability exists in the Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) component of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject adversarially perturbed text into the system's knowledge base. By employing a transfer-learning attack using a surrogate model (e.g., BERT) and word-level perturbation algorithms (e.g., TextFooler), an attacker can generate semantic-preserving descriptions that alter the vector…

RAG-targeted Adversarial Attack on LLM-based Threat Detection and Mitigation Framework
Evaluated models: Not reported

Semantic Intention Obfuscation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The KG-DF (Knowledge Graph Defense Framework) contains a logic vulnerability in its Semantic Parsing Module, specifically within the keyword extraction phase defined as $K_{core} = \text{LLM}(P_{prompt})$. The framework relies on a Large Language Model (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo) to distill user input into keywords ($K_{core}$), which are then embedded to retrieve security warning triples ($T_{match}$) from a Knowledge Graph.

KG-DF: A Black-box Defense Framework against Jailbreak Attacks Based on Knowledge Graphs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

LLM Factual MitM Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, LLaMA-2-13B, Mistral-7B, and Phi-3.5-mini, are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) adversarial prompt injections that undermine factual recall. Termed the "$\chi$mera" (Chimera) attack framework, this vulnerability exists when an attacker intercepts and modifies user queries (e.g., via malicious browser extensions, compromised frontends, or proxy middleware) before they reach the victim model. By appending adversarial…

Injecting Falsehoods: Adversarial Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Undermining Factual Recall in LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Phi-3

Adversarial Self-Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to "adversarial conversational nudges," where the model abandons its internal factual knowledge to align with user-provided misinformation in closed domains (e.g., movies, books). Unlike standard hallucinations where a model lacks knowledge, this vulnerability occurs even when the model demonstrates—via separate self-consistency checks—that it correctly identifies the information as false. When a user creates a multi-turn context asserting…

What About the Scene With the Hitler Reference? HAUNT: A Framework to Probe LLMs' Self-consistency in Closed Domains Via Adversarial Nudge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5, Claude Opus 4+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Grok 4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.