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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 7/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

The MASTER KEY framework exploits timing-based characteristics of Large Language Model (LLM) chatbot responses to infer internal defense mechanisms and automatically generate jailbreak prompts. This allows bypassing safety restrictions and eliciting responses violating usage policies, including generation of illegal, harmful, privacy-violating, and adult content. The framework utilizes a three-step process: reverse-engineering defenses via time-based analysis, creating proof-of-concept…

MasterKey: Automated Jailbreak Across Multiple Large Language Model Chatbots
Evaluated models: ERNIE, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2023
Analyzed 3/4/2025

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (LLMs) allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms through compositional adversarial attacks. The attack leverages the alignment between vision and language encoders, injecting malicious triggers into benign-looking images. These images, when paired with innocuous prompts, cause the LLM to generate harmful content. The attack requires access only to the vision encoder (e.g., CLIP), not the LLM itself, lowering the barrier to attack.

Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional adversarial attacks on multi-modal language models
Evaluated models: Llama-adapterv2

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Aligned large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a universal and transferable adversarial suffix attack. Appending a specific, automatically generated suffix to a wide range of prompts, even those requesting objectionable content, causes the models to generate harmful or objectionable responses instead of refusing the request. The attack's success rate is significantly higher on GPT-based models.

Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, Claude Instant 1, Claude 2 +12 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2023
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A prompt injection vulnerability allows attackers to manipulate the behavior of Large Language Model (LLM)-integrated applications by crafting malicious prompts that override the application's intended functionality. Attackers can achieve this by constructing prompts that cause the LLM to interpret malicious payloads as instructions, rather than data, leading to unintended actions such as data leakage, unauthorized LLM usage, or application mimicry. This vulnerability exploits the way user…

Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2023
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in vision-integrated Large Language Models (VLMs) allows an attacker to circumvent safety mechanisms through the use of adversarially crafted visual examples. A single, carefully constructed image can universally "jailbreak" the model, causing it to generate harmful content in response to a wide range of subsequent prompts, even those not included in the adversarial example's training data. This vulnerability extends beyond simple misclassification to encompass the execution of…

Visual adversarial examples jailbreak large language models
Evaluated models: InstructBLIP, MiniGPT-4

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2023
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically ChatGPT versions 3.5 and 4.0, are vulnerable to prompt engineering attacks that circumvent built-in content restrictions. Attackers can craft malicious prompts, categorized into "pretending," "attention shifting," and "privilege escalation" techniques, to elicit responses containing prohibited content (e.g., instructions for illegal activities, generation of harmful content). The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish…

Jailbreaking chatgpt via prompt engineering: An empirical study
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.