Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

65 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense retrieval mechanisms are vulnerable to topic-oriented adversarial corpus poisoning, specifically via the "Topic-FlipRAG" attack method. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the opinion or stance of the LLM's output across a broad cluster of related queries, rather than a single specific prompt. The attack leverages a two-stage pipeline: (1) Knowledge-Guided Attack, where an LLM is used to edit a target document to…

Topic-fliprag: Topic-orientated adversarial opinion manipulation attacks to retrieval-augmented generation models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Phi-3

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 3/19/2025

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent
Evaluated models: Alpaca, BERT, GPT-3 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing LangChain allows for indirect jailbreaks of Large Language Models (LLMs). By poisoning the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM through LangChain, attackers can manipulate the LLM's responses, causing it to generate malicious or inappropriate content. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the external knowledge base and bypasses direct prompt-based jailbreak defenses.

Poisoned langchain: Jailbreak llms by langchain
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, ChatGLM3 6B, ERNIE 3.5 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector, termed "RAG Poisoning," where malicious content is injected into the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM via prompt manipulation. This allows attackers to elicit undesirable or malicious outputs from the LLM, bypassing its safety filters. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the retrieved information during response generation.

Pandora: Jailbreak gpts by retrieval augmented generation poisoning
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.