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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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88 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Hidden Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Implicit Jailbreak Attacks via Cross-Modal Information Concealment on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4.5+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • InternVL 2 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct

Code-Mixed Phonetic Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple large language and multimodal models that allows for the bypass of safety filters through the use of code-mixed prompts with phonetic perturbations. An attacker can craft a prompt in a code-mixed language (e.g., Hinglish) and apply phonetic misspellings to sensitive keywords (e.g., spelling "hate" as "haet"). This technique causes the model's tokenizer to parse the sensitive word into benign sub-tokens, preventing safety mechanisms from flagging the harmful…

" Haet Bhasha aur Diskrimineshun": Phonetic Perturbations in Code-Mixed Hinglish to Red-Team LLMs
Evaluated models: Gemma 1.1 7B IT, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+2 more
  • Gemma 1.1 7B IT
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Fine-Grained Speech LLM Control

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Speech-LLMs Qwen2-Audio (7B-Instruct) and Granite-Speech (3.2-8b) are vulnerable to universal acoustic adversarial attacks. An attacker can optimize a fixed, input-agnostic audio segment (approximately 3.2 seconds in length) via gradient-based optimization on the model's frozen weights. When this adversarial segment is prepended to any arbitrary user speech input, it manipulates the model's latent representation, effectively overriding system prompts and generation behavior. This vulnerability…

Universal Acoustic Adversarial Attacks for Flexible Control of Speech-LLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 7B

On-Device LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

LLM Multi-Agent IP Leakage

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are vulnerable to intellectual property (IP) leakage attacks. An attacker with black-box access (only interacting via the public API) can craft adversarial queries that propagate through the MAS, extracting sensitive information such as system prompts, task instructions, tool specifications, number of agents, and system topology.

IP Leakage Attacks Targeting LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B

Universal VLLM Visual Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Vision-Language Models (VLLMs) that allows for transferable, targeted adversarial attacks. Attackers can generate adversarial image perturbations using an ensemble of open-source surrogate models (primarily CLIP-based visual encoders) which effectively transfer to proprietary, black-box VLLMs. The attack leverages a specific optimization framework that combines a Visual Contrastive Loss with multiple positive/negative visual examples, rather than relying solely on…

Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Black-Box Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct+6 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

MAD Amplified Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) frameworks leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to amplified jailbreak attacks. A novel structured prompt-rewriting technique exploits the iterative dialogue and role-playing dynamics of MAD, circumventing inherent safety mechanisms and significantly increasing the likelihood of generating harmful content. The attack succeeds by using narrative encapsulation, role-driven escalation, iterative refinement, and rhetorical obfuscation to guide agents…

Amplified Vulnerabilities: Structured Jailbreak Attacks on LLM-based Multi-Agent Debate
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o

Multimodal Contextual Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, dubbed PiCo, that leverages token-level typographic attacks on images embedded within code-style instructions. The attack bypasses multi-tiered defense mechanisms, including input filtering and runtime monitoring, by exploiting weaknesses in the visual modality's integration with programming contexts. Harmful intent is concealed within visually benign image fragments and code instructions, circumventing safety…

PiCo: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models via Pictorial Code Contextualization
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V
  • LLaVA 1.5

Multi-Accent Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multilingual and multi-accent audio inputs, combined with acoustic adversarial perturbations (reverberation, echo, whisper effects), can bypass safety mechanisms in Large Audio Language Models (LALMs), causing them to generate unsafe or harmful outputs. The vulnerability is amplified by the interaction between acoustic and linguistic variations, particularly in languages with less training data.

Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs
Evaluated models: DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B, MERaLion AudioLLM, MiniCPM-o 2.6+2 more
  • DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B
  • MERaLion AudioLLM
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6
  • Qwen 2 Audio
  • Ultravox

Multimodal Narrative Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector leveraging narrative-driven visual storytelling and role immersion to circumvent built-in safety mechanisms. The attack, termed MIRAGE, decomposes harmful queries into environment, character, and activity triplets, generating a sequence of images and text prompts that guide the MLLM through a deceptive narrative, ultimately eliciting harmful responses. The attack successfully exploits the MLLM's cross-modal…

MIRAGE: Multimodal Immersive Reasoning and Guided Exploration for Red-Team Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4V, Grok 2 Vision+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4V
  • Grok 2 Vision
  • InternVL
  • LLaVA Mistral
  • Qwen VL

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.