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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adaptive Web Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) based web agents (such as those built using the BrowserUse scaffold) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks when autonomously navigating and processing untrusted web content. Unlike standard Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), this vulnerability occurs when the LLM orchestrator consumes the DOM or visual screenshots of a webpage containing concealed or contextually disguised adversarial instructions. The LLM interprets these embedded text strings as…

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct

Cross-Modal Entanglement Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in advanced Vision-Language Models (VLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety alignment mechanisms via a Cross-Modal Entanglement Attack (COMET). By reframing malicious queries into multi-hop reasoning tasks, attackers can migrate visualizable key entities into a paired image and replace the textual entities with ambiguous spatial pointers. This forces the VLM to reconstruct the harmful intent through its own self-induced cross-modal reasoning, effectively bypassing filters that…

Red-teaming the Multimodal Reasoning: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Cross-modal Entanglement Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash+6 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen3-VL 235B-A22B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • GLM-4.5V
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Claude Haiku 4.5

LLM Strategic Prompt Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Alignment auditing methodologies used to verify the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs)—specifically black-box methods (Assistant Prefills, User Persona Sampling) and white-box interpretability methods (SAE Feature Description, Activation Token Embedding Similarity)—are vulnerable to prompt-level strategic deception. A misaligned "target" model, when supplied with a specific system prompt containing a high-level deceptive strategy and descriptions of the auditing tools, can obfuscate its…

Stress-Testing Alignment Audits With Prompt-Level Strategic Deception
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, Gemma 2 9B

Indic Attack Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically those aligned primarily using English-centric data (such as LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-OSS 20B, and Qwen3-32B), contain a cross-lingual safety generalization vulnerability. Safety guardrails and refusal logic fail to transfer effectively to linguistically distant languages, particularly Indic languages (Hindi, Assamese, Marathi, Kannada, and Gujarati). This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety alignment by translating structured adversarial…

Lost in Translation? A Comparative Study on the Cross-Lingual Transfer of Composite Harms
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B Instruct, GPT-oss 20B, Qwen 3 32B

VLM Split-Image Blindspot

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) utilizing independent vision encoders (e.g., ViT) and Large Language Model (LLM) decoders are vulnerable to Split-Image Visual Jailbreak Attacks (SIVA). The vulnerability arises from an architectural and alignment discrepancy: while the vision encoder processes image fragments (splits) in isolation via constrained attention or block-diagonal masks, the LLM decoder aggregates these features via cross-attention to reconstruct the semantic content. Current safety…

Robustness of Vision Language Models Against Split-Image Harmful Input Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 11B

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

History Reweighting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically LLaMA-3.2-11B, Qwen3-14B, Gemma 3-12B, and GPT-oss-20B, are vulnerable to black-box jailbreaking attacks via history-guided reinforcement learning (RL). The vulnerability arises from the models' inability to detect adversarial intent when prompts are iteratively refined based on historical interaction signals. An attacker can exploit this by employing a History-augmented Reinforcement Learning (HRL) framework, such as "TrailBlazer," which augments the…

TrailBlazer: History-Guided Reinforcement Learning for Black-Box LLM Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 11B, Qwen 3 14B+1 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.2 11B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Gemma 3 12B

Chunky Post-Training Miscalibration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability termed "chunky post-training," where the model learns spurious correlations between incidental prompt features (e.g., formatting styles, specific vocabulary, sentence structure) and specific behavioral modes (e.g., refusal, code generation, rebuttal) present in distinct chunks of post-training data. This results in behavioral mis-routing during inference, where benign inputs sharing surface-level features with restricted or specialized…

Chunky Post-Training: Data Driven Failures of Generalization
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5+5 more
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • GPT-5.1
  • Grok 4.1 Mini
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Tülu 3 405B

Evolutionary Hidden Knowledge Recovery

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) subjected to machine unlearning techniques (specifically AltPO, GradDiff, IDKDPO, IDKNLL, UNDIAL, NPO, and SimNPO) contain a vulnerability regarding the persistence of latent knowledge. Despite achieving high "forgetting" scores on standard, benign benchmarks, these models remain susceptible to black-box evolutionary adversarial attacks. An attacker can utilize an automated framework (REBEL) comprising a "Hacker" model and a "Judge" model to iteratively mutate…

REBEL: Hidden Knowledge Recovery via Evolutionary-Based Evaluation Loop
Evaluated models: Not reported

Invisible Prompt Phishing Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal LLM-based phishing detection systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via "perceptual asymmetry." Attackers can embed hidden instructions within a phishing site's HTML, CSS, URLs, or rendered images that remain imperceptible to human victims but are parsed and executed by the evaluating LLM. This vulnerability allows threat actors to manipulate the LLM's contextual understanding, forcing it to misclassify malicious sites as benign (Legitimate Pretexting), trigger safety…

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning, Llama 4 Maverick+1 more
  • GPT-5
  • Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 27B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.