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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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114 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), utilized for interpreting the internal residual stream activations of Large Language Models (LLMs) into human-understandable concepts, are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. By employing gradient-based optimization techniques adapted for SAEs (specifically a generalized Greedy Coordinate Gradient), an attacker can craft inputs via suffix appending or token replacement that manipulate the SAE's latent feature activations. This vulnerability allows for the…

Interpretability Illusions with Sparse Autoencoders: Evaluating Robustness of Concept Representations
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 4/30/2025
Analyzed 5/4/2025

A vulnerability in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allows bypassing safety mechanisms through targeted noise injection. Explainable AI (XAI) techniques reveal specific layers within the LLM architecture most responsible for content filtering. Injecting noise into these layers or preceding layers circumvents safety restrictions, enabling the generation of harmful or previously prohibited outputs.

XBreaking: Understanding how LLMs security alignment can be broken
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 0.5B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) decision-making capabilities described as "Rhetorical Persuasion Override." When an LLM is deployed as a judge or evaluator in a single-turn, multi-agent debate framework, it systematically fails to distinguish factual truth from confidently presented misinformation. An adversarial agent can coerce the evaluator into endorsing a known falsehood from the TruthfulQA dataset by employing specific rhetorical strategies—namely, high confidence…

When persuasion overrides truth in multi-agent llm debates: Introducing a confidence-weighted persuasion override rate (cw-por)
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 5/4/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety mechanisms based on supervised fine-tuning and preference alignment exhibit a vulnerability to "steering" attacks. Maliciously crafted prompts or input manipulations can exploit representation vectors within the model to either bypass censorship ("refusal-compliance vector") or suppress the model's reasoning process ("thought suppression vector"), resulting in the generation of unintended or harmful outputs. This vulnerability is demonstrated…

Steering the CensorShip: Uncovering Representation Vectors for LLM" Thought" Control
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 4/21/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) guardrail systems, including those relying on AI-driven text classification models (e.g., fine-tuned BERT models), are vulnerable to evasion via character injection and adversarial machine learning (AML) techniques. Attackers can bypass detection by injecting Unicode characters (e.g., zero-width characters, homoglyphs) or using AML to subtly perturb prompts, maintaining semantic meaning while evading classification. This allows malicious prompts and jailbreaks to…

Bypassing Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Detection in LLM Guardrails
Evaluated models: DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o Mini, mDeBERTa v3 Base

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing gradient-based optimization for jailbreaking defense are vulnerable to enhanced transferability attacks due to superfluous constraints in their objective functions. Specifically, the "response pattern constraint" (forcing a specific initial response phrase) and the "token tail constraint" (penalizing variations in the response beyond a fixed prefix) limit the search space and reduce the effectiveness of attacks across different models. Removing these…

Guiding not Forcing: Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreaking Attacks on LLMs via Removing Superfluous Constraints
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Predictive Large Language Model (LLM) routers, specifically those utilizing Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Matrix Factorization (MF) architectures, are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation and backdoor poisoning. These routers are designed to optimize cost and latency by dynamically directing simple queries to "weak" (cheap) models and complex queries to "strong" (expensive) models. Attackers can exploit this mechanism in two ways: 1. Inference-time Attacks: By appending specific adversarial…

Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM Router
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Jailbreak-Probability-based Attacks (JPA). JPA leverages a Jailbreak Probability Prediction Network (JPPN) to identify and optimize adversarial perturbations in input images, maximizing the probability of eliciting harmful responses from the MLLM, even with small perturbation bounds and few iterations. The attack operates by modifying the input image's hidden states within the MLLM to increase the predicted jailbreak probability.

Utilizing Jailbreak Probability to Attack and Safeguard Multimodal LLMs
Evaluated models: DeepSeek VL 1.3B, InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B, InternLM XComposer +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 3/4/2025

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety-alignment mechanisms by manipulating the model's internal attention weights. The attack, termed "Attention Eclipse," modifies the attention scores between specific tokens within a prompt, either amplifying or suppressing attention to selectively strengthen or weaken the influence of certain parts of the prompt on the model's output. This allows injection of malicious content while appearing benign to the model's…

Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 13B Chat +3 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.