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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

230 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

AI Persuasion Trust Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Adversarial Explanation Attacks (AEAs) introduce a behavioral vulnerability in Large Language Model (LLM) based decision-support systems where the communication channel between the AI and the user is exploited to induce trust in incorrect model predictions. By manipulating the framing of an explanation—specifically its reasoning mode, evidence type, communication style, and presentation format—an attacker can dissociate the perceived plausibility of an explanation from its factual correctness…

When AI Persuades: Adversarial Explanation Attacks on Human Trust in AI-Assisted Decision Making
Evaluated models: Llama 3.3 70B

Covert Grade Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for Automatic Short Answer Grading (ASAG) are vulnerable to the "GradingAttack" framework, which employs fine-grained adversarial manipulation to alter grading outcomes. Attackers can leverage two distinct strategies: (1) Prompt-level attacks using role-play injection strings that instruct the model to pretend an answer is correct regardless of factual accuracy, and (2) Token-level attacks utilizing gradient-based optimization (similar to Greedy Coordinate…

GradingAttack: Attacking Large Language Models Towards Short Answer Grading Ability
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Activation Delta Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Activation-delta-based linear probes used for detecting task drift and prompt injections in Large Language Models (LLMs) can be bypassed using universal adversarial suffixes. By utilizing the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) algorithm, an attacker can generate a single, optimized suffix that simultaneously fools multiple logistic regression classifiers attached to different hidden layers of the LLM. The attack jointly optimizes the suffix tokens by accumulating gradients from the losses of all…

Bypassing Prompt Injection Detectors through Evasive Injections
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Phi-3 8B

Pre-Task Persuasion Propagation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A behavioral vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agents where task-irrelevant persuasion introduced in prior interactions or system contexts induces a persistent "belief state" that alters downstream task execution. This phenomenon, termed "Persuasion Propagation," occurs when an agent adopts a stance on a controversial topic (e.g., politics, privacy) that is semantically unrelated to its primary function (e.g., coding, medical research). This adopted stance acts as a latent…

Persuasion Propagation in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B

Unified Robustness Gap

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+2 more
  • E5 BERT-base
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Skywork Reward V2

Payment Protocol Whisper Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Google Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), specifically within the reference implementation built using the Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) and Gemini models, contains vulnerabilities allowing for both indirect and direct prompt injection. The architecture fails to sufficiently isolate the Large Language Model (LLM) context from untrusted external data sources and user inputs.

Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash

Query-Agnostic Retrieval Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Model-based Retrieval (LLMR) systems allows attackers to intentionally hide specific documents from being retrieved (e.g., in RAG pipelines or search engines) by appending a small number of adversarially crafted, query-agnostic tokens. The attack operates in a complete black-box setting: it requires no knowledge of the victim's queries, the target retrieval model's parameters, or the underlying document corpus. By utilizing Document-Query Adversarial (DQ-A)…

" Someone Hid It": Query-Agnostic Black-Box Attacks on LLM-Based Retrieval
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Semantic Cache Collision Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Semantic caching mechanisms in LLM applications are vulnerable to cross-tenant cache key collision attacks (CacheAttack) due to the inherent mathematical conflict between locality-preserving fuzzy hashing and cryptographic collision resistance (the avalanche effect). An attacker can leverage gradient-based search algorithms to optimize an adversarial discrete suffix that, when appended to a malicious prompt, forces its output embedding vector to collide with the embedding of a targeted benign…

From Similarity to Vulnerability: Key Collision Attack on LLM Semantic Caching
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, DeepSeek R1

LLM Grading Compliance Paradox

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as automated code evaluators ("Universal Graders") are vulnerable to Semantic-Instruction Decoupling, a form of adversarial prompt injection that exploits the "Syntax-Semantics Gap." Attackers can embed adversarial directives into syntactically inert regions of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)—specifically comments, docstrings, variable names, and whitespace. While these regions are discarded by compilers (trivia nodes) or treated as arbitrary symbols…

The Compliance Paradox: Semantic-Instruction Decoupling in Automated Academic Code Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek V3

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.