Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

LLM-based navigation agents, including NavGPT and prompt-tuned outdoor agents, are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to hijack the physical movement of the agent by embedding optimized malicious instructions into benign natural language inputs. The issue arises because the agents parse user instructions to generate executable plans without sufficient separation between control logic and untrusted input. The PINA (Prompt Injection Attack…

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) contain a resource consumption vulnerability termed "Overflow," wherein specific non-adversarial, plain-text prompts trigger excessive text generation that saturates the model's output token budget. This vulnerability exploits the model's alignment towards helpfulness and exhaustiveness, alongside tokenizer inefficiencies (e.g., zero-width characters), to force the generation of maximum-length responses (often exceeding 5,000 tokens) from short inputs. This differs…

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to "hard-to-falsify" deceptive evidence injection, termed the "Facade of Truth." This vulnerability allows an attacker to override an LLM’s parametric knowledge (internal factual beliefs) by injecting sophisticated, iteratively refined fabricated evidence into the context window. Unlike overt misinformation which models typically reject, this attack utilizes a multi-agent adversarial framework (MisBelief) to generate evidence that mimics…

The Facade of Truth: Uncovering and Mitigating LLM Susceptibility to Deceptive Evidence
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-5, Llama 3 8B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

A stealthy resource exhaustion (Economic Denial-of-Service) vulnerability exists in the multi-turn tool-calling layer of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, particularly those utilizing the Model Context Protocol (MCP). An attacker controlling a third-party tool server can manipulate text-visible fields (such as argument descriptions and error messages) to force the LLM into a prolonged, verbose tool-calling loop. By demanding lengthy, non-semantic outputs (e.g., long comma-separated lists) and…

Beyond Max Tokens: Stealthy Resource Amplification via Tool Calling Chains in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B, GLM 4.5 Air, GPT-4o +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing external tool execution frameworks are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) via the "Tool Stream." Unlike traditional data-stream injections (e.g., malicious emails), this vulnerability exploits the agent's interpretation of functional tool definitions (docstrings, signatures) and runtime feedback (error messages, return values) as binding operational constraints. Adversaries functioning as compromised or malicious tool providers can embed…

VIGIL: Defending LLM Agents Against Tool Stream Injection via Verify-Before-Commit
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Qwen 3 Max

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Closed-source Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Universal Targeted Transferable Adversarial Attacks (UTTAA). An attacker can generate a single, image-agnostic adversarial perturbation ($\delta$) that, when added to any arbitrary source image, steers the victim model to output a description or classification matching a specific target image chosen by the attacker. This vulnerability exploits the transferability of adversarial features from open-source surrogate vision…

Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5 +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

The VILTA (VLM-in-the-Loop Trajectory Adversary) framework is vulnerable to Prompt Injection and Data Poisoning via un-sanitized scene representation inputs. The system integrates a Vision-Language Model (Gemini-2.5-Flash) into a closed-loop reinforcement learning environment, feeding it Bird’s-Eye-View (BEV) imagery alongside text-based vehicle dynamics data (e.g., position, speed, and risk_category) to generate challenging driving trajectories. An attacker who can manipulate the input…

VILTA: A VLM-in-the-Loop Adversary for Enhancing Driving Policy Robustness
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

A vulnerability exists in multiple state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, and LLaVA-OneVision, where persuasive textual misinformation successfully overrides visual evidence. When a model is presented with an image it can correctly interpret, an attacker can inject a contradictory text prompt employing specific rhetorical strategies (Logical, Credibility, Emotional, or Repetition) to force the model into generating a false response. This "obedience bias"…

Do Images Speak Louder than Words? Investigating the Effect of Textual Misinformation in VLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, InternVL3 1B +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.