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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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781 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a bi-modal adversarial prompt attack (BAP). BAP leverages a combined textual and visual prompt to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses, even in models designed to resist single-modality attacks. The attack first introduces a query-agnostic adversarial perturbation to the visual prompt, making the model more likely to respond positively regardless of the text. Then, an LLM refines the textual prompt iteratively to achieve…

Jailbreak Vision Language Models via Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a black-box query-response optimization attack (QROA). QROA iteratively refines a malicious prompt suffix using a surrogate model to maximize a reward function that measures the likelihood of eliciting harmful content from the LLM. This attack does not require access to the model's internal parameters or logits; it operates solely via standard query-response interactions.

QROA: A Black-Box Query-Response Optimization Attack on LLMs
Affects: Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat, Mistral 7B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned using chat templates are vulnerable to ChatBug, allowing malicious actors to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that intentionally deviate from the expected template format or overflow message fields. This exploits the LLM’s reliance on the template structure without enforcing similar constraints on user input.

ChatBug: A Common Vulnerability of Aligned LLMs Induced by Chat Templates
Affects: Claude 2.1, GPT-3.5 Turbo

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit increased vulnerability to adversarial prompts employing code-switching techniques, where multiple languages are interwoven within a single query. This vulnerability stems from an unintended correlation between the resource availability of the languages used in the prompt and the LLM's safety alignment. LLMs trained on imbalanced multilingual data are more susceptible to attacks leveraging low-resource languages, resulting in a higher rate of unsafe or…

Code-Switching Red-Teaming: LLM Evaluation for Safety and Multilingual Understanding

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM finetuning APIs allows covert malicious finetuning. Attackers can create a dataset where individual data points appear innocuous but, when used for finetuning, teach the LLM to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. This bypasses existing safety checks and evaluations because the training data appears benign.

Covert malicious finetuning: Challenges in safeguarding llm adaptation
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 70B

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based attack, termed RLbreaker, demonstrates the ability to more efficiently generate jailbreaking prompts for large language models (LLMs) than existing methods. The attack leverages a DRL agent to guide the search for effective prompt structures, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting undesirable responses to harmful questions. The effectiveness stems from the DRL agent's ability to strategically select prompt mutators, rather than relying on random…

When LLM Meets DRL: Advancing Jailbreaking Efficiency via DRL-guided Search
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 70B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat +3 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows circumvention of safety mechanisms through improved few-shot jailbreaking techniques. The attack leverages injection of special system tokens (e.g., [/INST]) into few-shot demonstrations and demo-level random search to optimize the probability of generating harmful responses. This bypasses defenses that rely on perplexity filtering and input perturbation.

Improved few-shot jailbreaking can circumvent aligned language models and their defenses
Affects: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

GPT-4o exhibits vulnerability to jailbreak attacks via audio prompts, despite enhanced safety against text-based attacks. Successful jailbreaks can be achieved by converting text prompts, including those optimized for adversarial attacks against other LLMs (demonstrated using GCG, AutoDAN, PAP, and BAP methods), into audio using text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis. This circumvention allows elicitation of unsafe responses from GPT-4o that would otherwise be prevented by its safety mechanisms. The…

Unveiling the safety of gpt-4o: An empirical study using jailbreak attacks
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4V, Llama 2 7B Chat

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks exploiting uncommon text-encoded structures (UTES) rarely encountered during training. These UTES, such as JSON, tree representations, or LaTeX code, embedded within prompts, cause LLMs to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful content. The attack's success stems from the LLM's difficulty in processing and interpreting these unusual structures, coupled with the obfuscation of malicious instructions within the structured…

StructuralSleight: Automated Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models Utilizing Uncommon Text-Encoded Structure
Affects: Claude 2, Claude 3 Opus, GPT-3.5 Turbo +3 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to knowledge-based jailbreaks, where an attacker provides domain-specific knowledge to elicit harmful or unintended outputs. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's ability to process and respond to knowledge inputs in a way that circumvents safety mechanisms, even if the input knowledge itself isn't inherently malicious. Attackers leverage this by constructing prompts that combine seemingly innocuous knowledge with subtly manipulative phrasing to…

Knowledge-to-jailbreak: One knowledge point worth one attack
Affects: FinanceChat 7B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +6 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.